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INTRODUCrIONO N April 15, 1996, the United States Supreme Court granted certi-
orari to Atherton v. FDIC.' Atherton involves claims against the
former directors of City Federal Savings Bank ("City Federal"), a fed-
erally-insured savings and loan ("S&L"). Beginning in 1985, the for-
mer directors of City Federal approved several large construction
loans which had little prospect of being repaid. The loans entailed a
high degree of risk because the bank failed to take reasonable steps to
secure either sufficient collateral or borrower wherewithal to assure
repayment. The Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") alleges that
the bank did not verify financial information provided by the borrow-
ers, did not obtain an adequate appraisal of the proposed collateral,
and did not follow its own lending policies and procedures.2 The loans
resulted in $100 million in losses. City Federal subsequently failed.
The government stepped in, paid off all depositors of City Federal,
and absorbed any losses resulting from a shortfall in City Federal's
assets. The government brought director liability claims, based upon
long-standing federal common-law authorities, for negligence against
City Federal's former board. The district court dismissed the claims,
* Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law. Professor
Ramirez has previously litigated bank manager liability cases on behalf of the Resolu-
tion Trust Corporation and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. From 1991 to
1992, Professor Ramirez was a Senior Attorney with the Professional Liability Section
of the RTCIFDIC. From 1992 through 1995, Professor Ramirez was an attorney in a
private law firm that represented the RTC and the FDIC.
1. 116 S. Ct. 1415 (1996), granting cerL sub nor. to RTC v. Cityfed Fin. Corp., 57
F.3d 1231 (3d Cir. 1995). Oral arguments for Atherton are scheduled to be heard on
November 4, 1996. 65 U.S.L.W. 3165, 3180 (Sept. 10, 1996). This Article addresses
only one of the two issues decided by the Third Circuit; that is, the viability of federal
common law claims arising from mismanagement of failed banks against the banks'
directors and officers. This Article does not address the viability of state law claims
arising from the failure of federally-chartered banks. See 57 F.3d at 1236 (noting that
the RTC asserted claims under both state and federal law).
2. Id at 1237. Atherton arrived at the Supreme Court on interlocutory appeal,
after the Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of negligence-based claims. See id at
1249. Thus, the Third Circuit accepted the RTC's allegations of fact as true.
3. Id at 1237.
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holding that only claims for gross negligence may be pursued.4 The
Third Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court will therefore address a
pivotal question remaining from the bank crisis of the 1980s that has
caused sharp division among the lower courts: Who should bear these
types of losses-the negligent directors of the failed bank or the U.S.
taxpayer?
The question before the Supreme Court cannot be understood with-
out providing some perspective on the bank crisis of the 1980s and the
government's response to the unprecedented taxpayer bailout of the
federal deposit insurance fund. The government responded to the cri-
sis by enacting a broad legislative revision of our nation's banking reg-
ulatory framework. This legislation is at the heart of the standard of
liability for managers of failed banks 5 and its meaning must be re-
solved by the Supreme Court.
In August, 1989, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Re-
form, Recovery, and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA").6 At the time of
this legislation, the long-brewing bank failure crisis only recently had
splashed into the nation's consciousness; this subject was addressed
directly only after the 1988 presidential election. 7 From the very in-
cipiency of the federal government's remediation efforts, the issues
underlying the allocation of the cost of, and responsibility for, the
bank crisis dripped with political gamesmanship.8 Although the bank-
4. In a bygone era the very thought that bank directors would be liable only for
gross negligence was repugnant:
It seems to me that it would be a monstrous proposition to hold that trust-
ees, entrusted with the management of the property, interests and business
of other people, who divest themselves of the management and confide in
them, are bound to give only slight care to the duties of their trust, and are
liable only in cases of gross inattention and negligence; and I have found no
authority fully upholding such a proposition.
Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 72 (1880).
5. This Article will use the term "failed bank" to mean any federally-insured de-
pository institution put into conservatorship or receivership by federal agencies. As
such, the term encompasses: banks, savings banks, S&L, credit unions, and savings
associations. The term "Federal Liquidators" refers to any federal agency charged
with liquidating a failed bank. Primarily this is the RTC and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC").
6. Pub. L. No. 101-73, Title II, § 212(k), 103 Stat. 243 (1989) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994)).
7. See ABC News Transcript of President Bush (Feb. 6, 1989), partially reprinted
in President's News Conference on Savings Crisis and Nominees, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7,
1989, at D8 [hereinafter President's News Conference].
8. See Walter Shapiro, What Debates Don't Tell Us, Tune, Oct. 19, 1992, at 32, 33
("Never mentioned was the fast-escalating savings-and-loan crisis [in the 1988 presi-
dential debates]."); see also James Greiff, Banking Calamity Fears Ebb: Record Prof-
its Avert 'December Surprise', Orange Co. Reg., Apr. 11, 1993, at KO1, available in
Westlaw, 1993 WL 8297624 ("The untold story of this presidential election is how the
Bush administration's bank regulators have sought to postpone a commercial bank
crisis until November. Then, soon after the election, the administration will suddenly
discover that there is-surprise!-a major banking crisis." (quoting Michael Wald-
man, December Surprise: Bush's Deferred Banking Crisis, The New Republic, June
[Vol. 65
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ing system has since stabilized,9 the law applicable to bank director
29, 1992, at 23)); Jerry Knight & Susan Schmidt, The Unmentioned Monster: Bush,
Clinton Reluctant to Discuss Coming Wave of Bank, Thrift Failures, Wash. Post, Oct.
4, 1992, at Hi (discussing the candidates' avoidance of the S&L issue during the 1992
campaign); Howard Rosenberg, A Sobering, Important Look at the 'Betrayal of De-
mocracy', L.A. Tunes, Apr. 15, 1992, at Fl (reviewing a "Frontline" special, "Betrayal
of Democracy," pointing to the S&L crisis as one example of Americans' alienation
from the political process). Political considerations at the judicial level are more sub-
tle; still at least one commentator has noted a 'judicial backlash' to bank director
liability lawsuits. Patricia A. McCoy, The Notional Business Judgment Rule in Bank-
ing, 44 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1031, 1034 n.9 (1995); see also Ralph Nader, Introduction to
Michael Waldman, Who Robbed America?: A Citizen's Guide to the S&L Scandal
xiii (1990) (calling the S&L scandal "the most outrageous example of banking corrup-
tion and governmental deregulatory complicity in American history"); Michael Wald-
man, The S&L Collapse: The Cost of a Congress for Sale, 2 Stan. L & Pol'y Rev. 47
(1990) (detailing the political genesis of the bank crisis).
9. "[EFor the past three years many banks on both sides of the Atlantic have been
enjoying an unusually long run of record profits and soaring share prices." Interna-
tional Banking: System Failure, The Economist, Apr. 27-May 3, 1996, at 5, 5. Still.
even though
most people ... assume that banking is nowadays under control, with the
danger of failures, panics and runs abolished by careful regulation and the
widespread system of deposit insurance.... [,] [the fact is that] the world's
banking system may be becoming even more dangerous than it used to be,
and the need for a thorough reform even more urgent.
How Safe is Your Bank?, The Economist, Apr. 27-May 3, 1996, at 15, 15.
Several emerging risks present novel threats to the entire international banking
system. First, banks have extensive exposure to the international derivatives, futures,
and securities markets. For example, several large American banks have between
200% and 600% of their equity invested in derivatives. International Banking: Dan-
gerous Deriving?, The Economist, Apr. 27-May 3, 1996, at 9, 9 [hereinafter Dangerous
Deriving]. Further, according to the Bank of International Settlements, the total
amount of outstanding over-the-counter derivatives held by banks has reached S41
trillion. Id. at 10. This type of exposure is responsible for the recent failure of Brit-
ain's Barings Bank. Id. Similarly, in March of 1996, the 21 largest Japanese banks
recognized $86 billion in losses, resulting in part from the weakness of the Japanese
stock market. International Banking: Coping with the Ups and Downs, The Econo-
mist, Apr. 27-May 3, 1996, at 3, 3 [hereinafter Coping with the Ups and Downs].
This exposure is exacerbated by the fact that, in 1996, lax internal controls at even
the largest banks still persist. Thus, a single bond trader at the New York branch of
Japan's Daiwa Bank accumulated $1.1 billion in trading losses over a period of 11
years without being detected. Dangerous Deriving, supra, at 10.
These risks are even more disturbing because of the increasing interdependency of
banks within the international banking system. This interdependence poses a risk
because the world's wholesale payments systems-networks among international
banks that permit the settlement of securities and foreign exchange transactions-
operate on a daily basis without any underlying security to assure payment of the
transactions from one bank to another that occur continuously between the banks.
On any given day, some professionals estimate that up to S6 trillion passes through
the world's wholesale payments systems, via both private and public intermediaries.
International Banking: Can't Pay, Won't Pay, The Economist, Apr. 27-May 3, 1996, at
13, 13. If an important international bank were to default, for any reason, the interna-
tional payment system would devolve into chaos, and, perhaps, lead to a string of
failures. Id
Of course, the banking industry continues to face traditional risks as well. Banks
periodically will fail the old-fashioned way, often in great waves. See Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Bank Failure: An Evaluation of the Factors Contribut-
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and officer liability actions is more confusing than ever. x0 This Article
ing to the Failure of National Banks (1988), reprinted in [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 87,387, at 93,981-82 [hereinafter Bank Failure] (find-
ing that "poor management and other internal problems" are the "common denomi-
nator[s]" of failed banks, and identifying the following factors as major causes of bank
failures: (i) 81% of failed banks had nonexistent or poorly followed loan policies; (ii)
42% of failed banks had overly aggressive or excessively growth-minded boards of
directors; (iii) 81% of failed banks had excessive credit exceptions such as missing
borrower financial statements and poor collateral documentation; and (iv) 35% of
failed banks were victims of insider abuse). It is truly amazing that, in this era of
business sophistication and complexity, the U.S. taxpayer is being saddled with a 30-
year, trillion dollar obligation for such fundamental and basic banking mishaps. See N.
Strunk & F. Case, Where Deregulation Went Wrong 14-16 (1988), reprinted in
Michael P. Malloy, The Regulation of Banking: Cases and Materials on Depository
Institutions and Their Regulators 126-127 (1992) (finding that the S&L crisis was pre-
cipitated by, inter alia, directors' uncontrolled use of new operating authority permit-
ting risky and speculative investment powers, and managements' ventures into credits
and markets in which they had little experience).
10. See, e.g., Warren L. Dennis & Jeremy R. Feinberg, The Evolving Standard of
Care for Bank Officers and Directors, 11 Rev. of Banking and Fin. Services, No. 16,
Sept. 27, 1995, at 177 ("Both the seasoned and novice practitioner will soon discover
that recent jurisprudence relating to the standard of care applicable to directors and
officers of failed financial institutions is confused, and getting more so."). Courts
have taken at least six distinct approaches to the law of failed bank director and of-
ficer liability in the wake of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k). First, some courts have held that
§ 1821(k) supersedes any preexisting federal common law and preempts state law. See
RTC v. Camhi, 861 F. Supp. 1121, 1128-29 (D. Conn. 1994); RTC v. O'Bear, Overhol-
ser, Smith & Huffer, 840 F. Supp. 1270, 1275 (N.D. Ind. 1993); FDIC v. Swager, 773 F.
Supp. 1244, 1248 (D. Minn. 1991).
Second, other courts have held or stated that § 1821(k) preempts neither federal
nor state law. See RTC v. Cityfed Fin. Corp., 57 F.3d 1231, 1243-47 (3d Cir. 1995), cert.
granted sub nom., Atherton v. FDIC, 116 S. Ct. 1415 (1996); RTC v. Gladstone, 895 F.
Supp. 356, 366 (D. Mass. 1995); RTC v. Fiala, 870 F. Supp. 962, 967 (E.D. Mo. 1994);
RTC v. Gibson, 829 F. Supp. 1110, 1117-1120 (W.D. Mo. 1993); RTC v. Gershman,
829 F. Supp. 1095, 1100 (E.D. Mo. 1993); RTC v. Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 (D.
Utah 1993); FDIC v. Nihiser, 799 F. Supp. 904, 907 (C.D. Ill. 1992); FDIC v. Black,
777 F. Supp. 919, 922 (W.D. Okla. 1991); see also FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532,
538 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that the FDIC's rights to proceed against officers,
whether under state or federal common law, are preserved by the plain language of
the last sentence of § 1821(k)), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 950 (1993); FDIC v. Canfield,
967 F.2d 443, 446 n.4 (10th Cir.) (citing Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992),
for the proposition that a savings clause must be interpreted according to its plain
meaning and thus, § 1821(k) must be interpreted to preserve state and federal law),
cert. dismissed, 506 U.S. 993 (1992); RTC v. Smith, 872 F. Supp. 805, 816 (D. Or. 1995)
(holding that McSweeney preserves federal common law claims).
Third, some courts have stated that § 1821(k) preempts state law, and do not di-
rectly address federal common law. See Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384, 391 (6th Cir.
1990), modified on other grounds, 933 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1991); RTC v. Zimmerman,
853 F. Supp. 1016, 1021 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
Fourth, some courts have stated that § 1821(k) does not preempt state law, and do
not directly address whether § 1821(k) supersedes federal law. See FDIC v. Raffa, 882
F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (D. Conn. 1995); RTC v. Gregor, 872 F. Supp. 1140, 1149
(E.D.N.Y. 1994); RTC v. Heiserman, 839 F. Supp. 1457, 1462 (D. Colo. 1993); RTC v.
DiDomenico, 837 F. Supp. 623, 627 (D.N.J. 1993); Washington Bancorp. v. Said, 812
F. Supp. 1256, 1265 (D.D.C. 1993); FSLIC v. Shelton, 789 F. Supp. 1360, 1363 (M.D.
La. 1992); see also FDIC v. Mintz, 816 F. Supp. 1541, 1545 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (finding
that § 1821(k) preempts state law only to the extent that state law permits a lower
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will examine why the law in this area is so chaotic and will attempt to
propose a sensible approach to the interpretation of 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(k), which is the primary provision of FIRREA addressing the
liability of directors and officers of failed banks.
The government systematically has obscured the full cost of the
1980s bank crisis. Estimates of the total cost to the U.S. taxpayer now
exceed $1 trillion." Even estimates of losses discounted to present
value are $150-215 billion.'2 In addition, the deposit insurance funds,
maintained by premium payments paid by the banks, lost billions
more. 3 The bank crisis also led to a total loss of stockholders' equity
in failed banks, and caused approximately $400 billion in losses to the
nation's stock of productive capital. 4 Ultimately, these staggering
losses had macroeconomic effects that diminished the nation's gross
national product ("GNP"); the Congressional Budget Office esti-
mated that the S&L crisis led to a "whopping" $500 billion in forgone
GNP." Such enormous numbers obviously require context for full
comprehension: If the total cost of the bank crisis is $1 trillion, then
standard of care than gross negligence); FDIC v. Isham, 777 F. Supp. 828, 832 (D.
Colo. 1991) (same).
Fifth, courts have held that although § 1821(k) supersedes federal common law,
even a federally-chartered thrift may give rise to state claims. See RTC v. Williams,
887 F. Supp. 1415, 1419 (D. Kan. 1995); RTC v. Rahn, 854 F. Supp. 480, 485 (W.D.
Mich. 1994); FDIC v. Barham, 794 F. Supp. 187, 191 (W.D. La. 1991), affd, 995 F.2d
600 (5th Cir. 1993).
Finally, courts have held that § 1821(k) supersedes federal common law without
addressing the impact on state law. See RTC v. Frates, 52 F.3d 295, 296 (10th Cir.
1995); FDIC v. Bates, 42 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357,
1365 (5th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 425 (7th Cir. 1993); FDIC v.
Gonzalez-Gorrondona, 833 F. Supp. 1545, 1553 (S.D. Fla. 1993); RTC v. Farmer, 823
F. Supp. 302, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1993); FDIC v. Miller, 781 F. Supp. 1271, 1276 (N.D. Il.
1991).
Additionally, there are countless unreported decisions addressing the issues dis-
cussed in this Article.
11. Kathleen Day, S&L Hell: The People and the Politics Behind the S1 Trillion
Savings and Loan Scandal 9 (1993).
12. Compare National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement, Origins and Causes of the S&L Debacle: A Blueprint for Reform,
A Report to the President and Congress of the United States 4 (1993) [hereinafter
FIRREA Report] (estimating present value cost of $150-175 billion) with Congres-
sional Budget Office, The Economic Effects of the Savings and Loan Crisis 12-13
(1992) [hereinafter CBO Study] (estimating present value cost of S215 billion and
stating that "[s]ome of the costs of resolving the S&L crisis have been obscured be-
cause of the way they have been financed").
13. For example, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC")
had total reserves of $5.6 billion in 1984. Lawrence J. White, The S&L Debacle: Pub-
lic Policy Lessons for Bank and Thrift Regulation 135 (1991). The dissipation of this
fund necessitated the federal bail out.
14. CBO Study, supra note 12, at 31 and app. B.
15. Id at 40.
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that represents approximately eighteen percent of the entire annual
output of the economy of the United States.16
It seems odd that, in light of this catastrophe, Congress would pass
protective legislation insulating the managers of failed banks, specifi-
cally the directors and officers, from liability.17 Protection of such
managers is particularly strange given that the causes of the crisis in-
cluded pervasive mismanagement.' Yet, the majority of circuit courts
have reached this result when interpreting § 1821(k).' 9
Individuals were protected from the crisis by deposit insurance
funds. The deposit insurance funds, backed by the full faith and credit
of the United States, protected insured depositors, prevented bank
runs, and forestalled the massive disintermediation, i.e., withdrawal of
capital from the banking system, of the 1930s.2 ° Consequently, the
nation avoided a possible depression. The Federal Liquidators had
rescued the depositors but were left holding an enormous tab.2'
The government financed the taxpayer bailout over the course of
thirty years, thereby obscuring the taxpayer burden. 2 Thus, there
were no angry depositors or taxpayers to lead public outcry for reform
or to demand that responsibility be appropriately borne by those who
caused the crisis. Deposit insurance and the structure of the bailout
16. The GNP was $5.34 trillion for 1994. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of
Econ. Analysis, BEA 95-51, Com. News, at 7, Table 2 (Oct. 27, 1995).
17. The management of a bank is generally under the direction of the board of
directors. See 12 U.S.C. § 71 (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(7) (1996) ("The [bank] shall be
under the direction of a board of directors . .. ."); 12 C.F.R. § 552.6-1 (1996) ("The
business and affairs of the association shall be under the direction of its board of
directors."). Of course, the directors are permitted to appoint officers to manage the
day-to-day affairs of the bank. 12 C.F.R. § 544 (app. § 9).
18. See infra notes 327-30 and accompanying text.
19. One explanation for this incongruous result could be political. In fact, after
years of being left to common law development, there recently has been an explosion
of political activity aimed at limiting director liability. See, e.g., James J. Hanks, Jr.,
Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director & Officer Liability Limitation and In-
demnification, 43 Bus. Law. 1207 (1988) (analyzing state legislation from 40 jurisdic-
tions which limit director liability). Recently, Representative William McCollum
introduced legislation aimed at drastically limiting director liability in the context of
failed banks. H.R. 316, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2, 3, 5 (1995). This legislation has not
been enacted. Bank lobbying groups have also been active in bank manager liability
cases by submitting amicus briefs. See, e.g., RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 417 (7th
Cir. 1993) (acknowledging a brief submitted by American Bankers Association); see
also Alex Elson & Michael L. Shakman, The ALI Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance: A Tainted Process and a Flawed Product, 49 Bus. Law. 1761, 1763-68 (1994)
(noting that political lobbying by lawyers representing the interests of corporate man-
agement regressively influenced the ALI and restricted director and officer
accountability).
20. President's News Conference, supra note 7, at D8 ("In all the time since crea-
tion of the deposit insurance savers have not lost one dollar of insured deposits, and I
am determined that they never will.").
21. See FIRREA Report, supra note 12, at 61.
22. White, supra note 13, at 152; Kenneth Ryder, A Guide to FIRREA's Off-




defused and diffused the type of political pressure for radical change
that was present in the 1930s. Nevertheless, the bank crisis provoked
public concern over the cost of the bail-out; no politician suggested
that any action be taken except to lower the cost to the government.23
In contrast, directors and officers of failed banks actively sought to
restrict their liability for the bank crisis. These individuals were being
haled into court across the country to answer for the sins and excesses
of the 1980s.24 The directors and officers, by the nature of their posi-
tions, were both well-heeled and well-connected. They also had an
incentive to take their plight to the press; in fact, numerous press re-
ports attacked the government's efforts to recover losses from direc-
tors and officers- 5 Litigation is both expensive and unpleasant; thus,
they also had a great incentive to exert political pressure to ease the
efforts to enforce their duties in court.' Still, it seems more likely
that confusion, rather than the directors' lobbying efforts, is responsi-
ble for the anomalous result that a majority of circuit courts have insu-
lated officers and directors from preexisting liabilities.
On the eve of enactment of FIRREA, the circuit courts' approach
to the issue of the source of law applicable to define the duties of bank
managers was chaotic at best. For example, federally-insured failed
banks could be chartered or incorporated either federally or in any of
the fifty states. This raised questions as to the appropriate source of
the law defining the duties of a bank's directors and officers. Courts
were split, moreover, on the effect of federal deposit insurance on the
23. See 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(i) (1994) (requiring liquidators to maximize
recovery on disposition of failed banks' assets).
24. Michael Bradford, Is Vault Half Full or Half Empty?: FDIC Reports Suing in
"Only" Half the Failures, Bus. Ins., Mar. 2, 1992, at 12, 12; Alfred J.T. Byrne & Judith
Bailey, FDIC Addresses Three D&O Lawsuit Issues, ABA Banking J., Oct. 1992, at
47, 47.
25. See, eg., Gretchen Morgenson, What Did Pop Expect to Happen When He
Gave the Kid His Credit Card?, Forbes, Sept. 28, 1992, at 95, 96 (describing the FDIC
as "a government agency utterly out of control, terrorizing innocent bystanders and
frequently costing the taxpayers far more in legal fees than it is recovering").
26. For example, the American Banker's Association has submitted amicus briefs
in nearly every significant bank director and officer case and has pursued legislative
efforts to reduce the ability of the Federal Liquidators to pursue claims against bank
directors and officers. For instance, in RTC v. Fleischer, 892 P.2d 497 (Kan. 1995), the
court specifically noted that defendants actively lobbied for insulating legislation. Id.
at 499; see supra note 19. Additionally, state legislatures have attempted to maximize
the insulation extended to bank directors by promulgating restrictive definitions of
liability specifically for actions brought by the RTC or FDIC. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-
5831 (1993); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6:786(B) (West Supp. 1996); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-
21,240 (1993); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 6, § 712(c) (West 1996); S.D. Codified Laws Ann.
§ 51A-15-19 (1993); Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-840(4) (1995). Some courts have held
these statutes, which exhibit a unique hostility towards federal banking agencies, un-
constitutional. RTC v. Conner, 871 F. Supp. 1424, 1427 (W.D. Okla. 1993) (finding
state statute unconstitutional under Oklahoma Constitution); Fleischer, 892 P2d at
507 (holding that retroactive application of statute violates Kansas Constitution).
1996]
632 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
law applicable to directors and officers of failed banks.27 Thus, federal
courts have split sharply on whether federal common law applies to
federally-chartered banks, as well as whether federal common law ap-
plies to state-chartered, federally-insured banks.28
The cyclical nature of bank failures exacerbated the confusion re-
garding the applicable law. Prior to the 1980s, there were small waves
of failures in the sixties and the forties, but the last great wave of bank
failures was in the 1930s, meaning that much of the case law governing
the duties of directors and officers of federally-insured banks was
well-seasoned. The Erie doctrine, 9 for example, did not exist when
much of this case law was developed. Prior to Erie, federal courts did
not engage in detailed analysis as to the source of the law being ap-
plied in a given case. Thus, much of the relevant case law does little to
clarify the appropriate source of law.
Furthermore, by 1988, many states had reacted to lobbying by di-
rectors and officers to greatly restrict their liability.30 The impact of
27. Compare FSLIC v. Capozzi, 855 F.2d 1319, 1325-26 (8th Cir. 1988) (refusing to
apply federal common law to a case involving a state-chartered, federally-insured as-
sociation), vacated on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1062 (1989); and RTC v. Hess, 820 F.
Supp. 1359, 1370 (D. Utah 1993) ("[F]ederal common law should not be applied to
state-chartered, federally-insured associations . . . ."); with First Hawaiian Bank v.
Alexander, 558 F. Supp. 1128, 1131-32 (D. Haw. 1983) (applying federal common law
to state-chartered bank); and FSLIC v. Sajovich, 642 F. Supp. 74, 77 (C.D. Cal. 1986)
(holding that federal common law claims apply to state-chartered but federally-in-
sured institutions). The issue is the converse for federally-chartered banks. Again,
confusion reigns. Compare RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that "national law" governs the liability of bank director and officers for federally-
chartered banks); Barany v. Buller, 670 F.2d 726, 734 (7th Cir. 1982) (concluding that
federal common law governs internal affairs of federal credit unions); Eureka Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Kidwell, 672 F. Supp. 436, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (same); City
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Crowley, 393 F. Supp. 644, 654-56 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (same);
and Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 371 F. Supp. 306, 314 (C.D. Cal.
1973) (ruling that federal common law governs internal affairs of federal savings and
loan) with RTC v. Gregor, 872 F. Supp. 1140, 1144-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that
state law governs claims against directors and officers of federally-chartered banks);
and Ameriflrst Bank v. Bomar, 757 F. Supp. 1365, 1372-74 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (holding
that federal common law does not apply to federally-chartered banks).
28. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (applying federal
common law to state-chartered bank and distinguishing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, cert. denied, 305 U.S. 637 (1938)); see also supra note 26 (discussing how some
courts have struck down as unconstitutional state statutes hostile to federal banking
agencies). Compare FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying federal
common law to state-chartered bank) with Gregor, 872 F. Supp. at 1144-45 (finding
that federal common law does not apply even to federally-chartered banks). The op-
eration of federal common law continues notwithstanding the Erie doctrine, which
limited federal common law from varying state law with respect to state claims, in
areas of paramount federal interest. See infra part II (discussing extensively the viabil-
ity of federal common law in the context of federally-chartered and federally-insured
banks).
29. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-80 (holding that state common law, not federal common
law, governs claims based upon state law).
30. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-202(B)(1) (West 1996) (permitting a com-
pany's stockholders to adopt provisions that would restrict a director's liability to the
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this insulating legislation on the duties of bank managers was uncer-
tain and increased the confusion regarding the appropriate source of
law. In short, even legal experts were unsure of the law applicable to
directors of failed federally-insured banks. At the time of FIRREA's
enactment, the executive branch and Congress could only have been
confused by the state of the law on even such basic threshold issues as
which law to apply.3' This underlying uncertainty profoundly influ-
ences the meaning of the legislation.
One thesis of this Article is that when the political branches enacted
FIRREA and § 1821(k) to address the issue of director and officer
liability, the courts were so hopelessly divided that Congress could not
enact legislation that would address each circuit's law. The political
branches did not comprehend the state of the law at the time because
of the extreme judicial confusion surrounding the issues; therefore,
any interpretation assuming that Congress did is untenable. The polit-
ical branches instead had only general policy objectives for FIRREA
as a whole, and § 1821(k) was intended to vindicate these objectives in
a limited way. These policy objectives included: minimizing the cost
of resolving the bank crisis; recovering losses from those responsible
for the crisis; retreating from the "lax" financial institution regulation
of the 1980s; and preventing future bank failures. There is no indica-
receipt of unentitled financial benefits, actions that intentionally inflict harm on the
corporations or shareholders, violations of § 10-833, or intentional violations of crimi-
nal law); Cal. Corp. Code § 204(a)(10) (West 1995) (same); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (1994) (same); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.0831(b)(5) (West 1993) (stating that a
director is not personally liable to the corporation or other persons unless, among
other things, "the director's breach ... constitutes ... recklessness or an act or omis-
sion which was committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose"); Ind. Code Ann.
§ 23-1-35-1(e)(2) (Bums 1994) (declaring that directors are not liable unless their con-
duct constitutes at least "willful misconduct or recklessness"); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit.
13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1995) (precluding liability unless dishonesty or bad faith is
shown); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.59(D) (Page 1992 & Supp. 1995) (requiring
"deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation" or "reckless disregard for the
best interests of the corporation" to impose director liability); see also Model Business
Corp. Act § 2.02(b)(4) (1996) (stating that the articles of incorporation may include
"a provision eliminating or limiting the liability of a director to the corporation or its
shareholders for money damages for any action taken, or any failure to take any ac-
tion, as a director" with certain exceptions); Hanks, supra note 19, at 1210-21 (analyz-
ing state legislation by 40 states, between 1986 and 1988, insulating directors, to
varying degrees, from common law liability).
31. See Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., Director Liability Under FIRREA: Negligence
and Gross Negligence in the Courts, 48 Consumer Fi. L.Q. Rep. 77 (1994); Colleen A.
Coyne, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Banking Law, 48 SMU L Rev. 781,786 (1995);
Peter G. Weinstock, Directors and Officers of Failing Banks: Pitfalls and Precautions,
106 Banking LJ. 434,449-50 (1989); David B. Fischer, Comment, Bank Director Lia-
bility Under FIRREA: A New Defense For Directors and Officers of Insolvent Deposi-
tory Institutions-or a Tighter Noose? 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1703, 1746-53 (1992);
Christopher T. Gorman, Note, Liability of Directors and Officers Under FIRREA:
The Uncertain Standard of § 1821(k) and the Need for Congressional Reform, 83 Ky.
LJ. 653, 667-71 (1994); Steven B. Price, Comment, FIRREA's Statute on the Standard
of Liability for Bank Directors and Officers: Through the Looking Glass of New Tex-
tualism, 30 Idaho L. Rev. 219, 225-53 (1993).
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tion that the political branches desired to extend a subsidy to negli-
gent directors and officers in the form of insulating legislation.
This Article examines issues critical to the recent jurisprudence of
§ 1821(k), including the intent of the political branches, Erie consider-
ations, and the application of federal common law. Part I of this Arti-
cle discusses the judiciary's interpretation of § 1821(k), highlighting
the two main circuit court approaches to the statute's construction.
Furthermore, part I explores the common law background of this is-
sue, at both the state and federal level, and notes that common law
has always imposed a standard of liability of ordinary care upon bank
directors.32 Once part I sets forth the complexity of the choice of law
issues, two conclusions follow: first, § 1821(k) was enacted by the
political branches in the face of great uncertainty over choice of law
issues and in pursuit of general policy objectives that are utterly incon-
sistent with insulating directors and officers from duties for which they
knowingly bargained; and second, § 1821(k) must operate to preserve
preexisting federal common law duties of ordinary care for officers
and directors of federally-insured banks. This, directors and officers
fully expected. 3 Part II notes the compelling governmental interest in
federally-insured banks and asserts that federal common law is consis-
tent with § 1821(k). Thus, part II concludes that federal common law
should apply to federally-insured banks, including banks that are
state-chartered. Next, part III examines both the congressional and
presidential intent behind FIRREA and § 1821(k), as well as several
overlooked rules of statutory construction, all of which support the
conclusion that FIRREA does not preempt federal common law. Fi-
nally, part IV considers a possible economic justification for the prop-
osition that § 1821(k) supersedes federal common law. Part IV posits
that the only logical economic conclusion is that § 1821(k) does not
preempt federal common law. This Article concludes that § 1821(k)
must be interpreted in light of the political branches' general policy
objectives, which did not include an unstated and undebated subsidy
to negligent bank directors and officers. Thus, irrespective of state
law considerations, these directors and officers should be held person-
ally liable if they negligently breach their duties under federal com-
mon law. Personal liability of directors and officers is the best way to
32. See, e.g., FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424, 1432 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that bank
"[d]irectors must exercise ordinary care and prudence in the administration of the
affairs of a bank" (quoting Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 165 (1891))); FDIC v.
Appling, 992 F.2d 1109, 1113 (10th Cir. 1993) (upholding jury instruction stating that
"directors and officers of a bank must use the same degree of care, skill and diligence
used by ordinarily prudent and diligent bank directors and officers" (citing Hoehn v.
Crews, 144 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1944), affd sub nom., Garber v. Crews, 324 U.S. 200
(1945))); Rankin v. Cooper, 149 F. 1010, 1013 (C.C.W.D. Ark 1907) ("Directors are
charged with the duty of reasonable supervision over the affairs of [a] bank."); Litwin
v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ("Undoubtedly, a director of a bank is
held to stricter accountability than the director of an ordinary business corporation.").
33. See infra part I.E.
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avoid another bank crisis and to protect the deposit insurance fund; in
the context of the banking system this is the only sensible economic
approach, particularly in the face of a historic bank crisis of monu-
mental proportions.
I. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE TO DISASTER: EASE LONG-
STANDING AND SETTLED RuLEs OF DIRECTOR AND
OFFICER RESPONSIBILITY?
This part compares the primary approaches courts have taken in
interpreting § 1821(k) and the common law as it existed on the date of
FIRREA's passage. In addition, this part explores the settled expec-
tations and understandings of bank directors and officers regarding
their duties.
Bank managers have been subject to a common law duty of ordi-
nary care for at least a century. Bank managers have always been
well-aware of this duty. It is unreasonable to conclude that the polit-
ical branches intended to lessen these duties in the wake of the 1980s
bank crisis. Nonetheless, the courts have varied in their interpretation
of § 1821(k), and several have held that Congress did in fact lessen the
duties of failed bank directors and officers. A comparison of RTC v.
Gallagher,' which concludes that directors of failed federal banks do
not have a federal common law duty of ordinary care with RTC v.
Cityfed Financial Corp.,35 which concludes the opposite, illustrates the
two primary approaches of the circuit courts to the construction of 12
U.S.C. § 1821(k).
12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) appears to be relatively straightforward,
providing:
A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be
held personally liable for monetary damages in any civil action by,
on behalf of, or at the request or direction of the [Federal Liquida-
tors] ... acting as conservator or receiver of such institution ... for
gross negligence, including any similar conduct or conduct that
demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross negli-
gence) including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms are de-
fined and determined under applicable State law. Nothing in this
paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the [Federal Liquida-
tors] under other applicable law.36
Certainly the political branches did not intend to create a uniform
standard of liability, for otherwise they would have simply stated: The
Federal Liquidators may only sue directors and officers of failed
banks for gross negligence. The clear text of the statute therefore sets
a floor on the duties of directors and officers while preserving any
34. 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1992).
35. 57 F.3d 1231 (3rd Cir. 1995), cert granted sub nom., Atherton v. FDIC, 116 S.
Ct. 1415 (1996).
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994).
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existing rights of the Federal Liquidators. Still, the courts have as-
sumed varied and inconsistent positions with respect to the standard
of care applicable to directors of failed banks pursuant to § 1821(k).37
A. The Seventh Circuit Approach
The Seventh Circuit held in RTC v. Gallagher"8 that the Federal
Liquidators may not pursue any federal common law claims for ordi-
nary negligence against directors of failed banks in light of
§ 1821(k).39 Shortly after Gallagher, the Seventh Circuit ruled in RTC
v. Chapman40 that the Federal Liquidators may not pursue any state
law claims against directors of failed banks that are federally-
chartered. 41 Instead, under Chapman, only state-chartered banks en-
joy state law based causes of action against directors and officers.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit interprets § 1821(k) as if it stated: Directors
and officers of federally-chartered banks may be sued exclusively for
conduct amounting to a minimum of gross negligence; directors and
officers of state-chartered banks may be sued for gross negligence or
for any claims under state law.
The Seventh Circuit approach is based upon two principles. First, if
Congress "speaks directly" to an issue by exercising its legislative
power in a given matter, then federal common law is superseded.42
Second, if directors are sued for breaching their duties to a corpora-
tion, then the jurisdiction of incorporation provides the substantive
law governing the litigation.43
1. Gallagher's Supersession Analysis
In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois," the Supreme Court held that Con-
gress, by enacting an "all-encompassing" program of interstate water
pollution regulation, intended to occupy the field of interstate water
pollution and, therefore, superseded federal common law remedies
provided by nuisance claims.' The Court distinguished Illinois v. City
of Milwaukee,"4 which held that legislation merely "touching inter-
state waters" was inadequate to supplant federal common law.47 At
no point in either decision did the Court intimate that the only test for
determining supersession of federal common law is whether Congress
"spoke directly" to the issue previously addressed by federal common
37. See supra note 10.
38. 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993).
39. Id at 424.
40. 29 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994).
41. Id at 1122.
42. Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 419.
43. Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1122.
44. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
45. Id. at 317-19.
46. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
47. Id at 101-04, 102 n.3.
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law. Rather, the Court plainly asked not just whether Congress had
"spoken" but also whether Congress's regulation was sufficiently
"comprehensive" to indicate an intent to occupy the field.48 The
Court stated:
We conclude that, at least so far as concerns the claims of respon-
dents, Congress has not left the formulation of appropriate federal
standards to the courts through application of often vague and inde-
terminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence,
but rather has occupied the field through the establishment of a
comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert admin-
istrative agency.49
Thus, the comprehensive nature of the regulation, rather than simply
the regulation itself, indicated Congress's intent to occupy the field.
Under the Supreme Court's analysis, the Gallagher court found that
FIRREA comprehensively spoke to the issue of bank director regula-
tion and "created" expert administrative agencies to supervise and ad-
minister the FIRREA regulatory scheme. 0 The court stated that
FIRREA expanded federal authority over directors of federally-in-
sured banks.5 1 Based upon these conclusions, the court applied the
reasoning of City of Milwaukee and determined that FIRREA super-
seded preexisting federal common law.51
The Gallagher court did not ignore the content of the statute, but
rather focused its inquiry on whether the substance of § 1821(k)
"spoke directly" to the issue of director and officer liability. 3 The
court concluded that the "plain language" of the statute spoke directly
to the issue of failed bank director liability.s The Gallagher court
therefore found that FIRREA superseded federal common law.
The Seventh Circuit then searched the legislative history of FIR-
REA to support its statutory construction.55 In construing § 1821(k),
the Gallagher court found that the use of "may" in § 1821(k) does not
refer to, nor qualify, the gross negligence standard but instead refers
to the ability of the Federal Liquidators to sue.S6 In other words, ac-
cording to Gallagher, the use of "may" is simply a statutory reaffirma-
tion that the Federal Liquidators are not required to sue for gross
48. City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 318-19.
49. Id. at 317.
50. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 424 (7th Cir. 1993). Although FIRREA did create
expert administrative agencies, the Seventh Circuit was plainly wrong to conclude
that FIRREA somehow increased the occupation of the field in this manner, for each
FIRREA-created agency, another agency was abolished. Thus, the Office of Thrift
Supervision ("OTS") replaced the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB"), and
the RTC replaced the FSLIC.
51. Id at 424.
52. Id
53. Id at 419.
54. Id at 419-20.




negligence.57 The court then found that the last sentence of § 1821(k),
also known as the "savings clause," would render the remainder of the
statute surplusage if it preserved federal common law.58 Specifically,
the Seventh Circuit found that preserving ordinary negligence claims
would render meaningless the "substantive" portion of the statute.59
Instead, the court found that the savings clause actually refers only to
enforcement powers granted the government under § 1818.60 Finally,
the court highlighted legislative history supporting its restrictive read-
ing of § 1821(k). 61 Based upon these conclusions, the court found that
§ 1821(k) demonstrated an intent by Congress to preempt federal
common law.62
2. Chapman and State Law Claims
Gallagher specifically declined to address the availability of state
law based claims arising from the failure of a federally-chartered
thrift.63 In RTC v. Chapman,' the Seventh Circuit shut the door on
any such claims; this decision thus limits the Federal Liquidators to
claims for only gross negligence when pursuing directors of failed fed-
eral banks in the Seventh Circuit.65 In other words, § 1821(k) was
interpreted as if it were written to provide that directors of failed
banks may only be liable for gross negligence except in the case of
state-chartered banks.66
Chapman's analysis depends upon the internal affairs doctrine as
embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 302.67
Specifically, under the internal affairs doctrine, unless another juris-
diction has a more substantial interest in the dispute, the jurisdiction
creating a corporation defines the duties of the directors of the corpo-
ration. Chapman applied this choice of law rule to federally-chartered
banks to conclude that no state law based claims were available to the
Federal Liquidators.68 Chapman thus concluded that choice of law
57. Id
58. Id. at 420.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 420-21.
61. Id. at 421-23.
62. Id. at 424. The Gallagher court also discussed the impact of a legislative effort
to clarify § 1821(k)'s savings clause to preserve common law standards of ordinary
negligence. Il at 423. Since the Gallagher opinion, however, legislation has also been
introduced, but not passed, to modify § 1821(k) to extend insulation from liability to
directors. H.R. 316, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Thus, for now, the only conclusion
that can be drawn from post-legislative activity regarding § 1821(k) is that Congress is
hopelessly distracted on this vital issue.
63. Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 424.
64. 29 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994).
65. Id at 1123.
66. Id.
67. Id at 1122 (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 302 (1971)).
68. Id at 1123.
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principles rendered § 1821(k) the exclusive standard of liability for di-
rectors and officers of failed federal banks.69
Interestingly, in the Seventh Circuit, federal common law appears
to provide for an ordinary negligence standard of care for claims
against directors and officers of failed state-chartered, federally-in-
sured banks not subject to FIRREA.7 0 Therefore, in cases not involv-
ing bank failure, or arising prior to FIRREA, bank directors must
exercise ordinary care to avoid liability." Furthermore, state-
chartered but federally-insured banks often present the same risks to
the national treasury as federally-chartered banks; nonetheless, failed
state banks are apparently subject, under Chapman, to fifty different
state legislatures or state supreme courts to define the liabilities of
their directors. The RTC raised these anomalies in Gallagher and
Chapman, but the Seventh Circuit did not address the basis of these
anomalies.72 Therefore any policy support for such distinctions re-
mains obscure.
Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit correctly termed the
combined effect of Gallagher and Chapman as "crazy!"'  Judge Pos-
ner found no policy basis for the result that a bank director is liable
for a higher duty of care-ordinary care rather than gross negli-
gence-prior to failure rather than after failure.74 Judge Posner was
similarly at a loss for the policy basis supporting the distinction in the
duty of care owed by directors and officers of state banks compared to
that owed by directors and officers of federal banks. 75 Posner con-
cluded that, because FIRREA was intended to impose more stringent
standards upon bank managers, "[t]he statute has been turned on its
head."76
69. Id at 1124-25.
70. FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424, 1432-33 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Briggs v. Spauld-
ing, 141 U.S. 132, 165-66 (1891); Martin v. Webb, 110 U.S. 7, 15 (1884)).
71. For instance, in FDIC v. Appling, 992 F.2d 1109 (10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth
Circuit described the standard of care for directors and officers of a federally-
chartered bank "as requiring such care and diligence as an ordinarily prudent man
would exercise with reference to the administration and management of such a mon-
eyed institution." Id. at 1113 (quoting Hoehn v. Crews, 144 F.2d 665, 672 (10th Cir.
1994), aff'd sub nom., Garber v. Crews, 324 U.S. 200 (1945)); see also FDIC v. Bier-
man, 2 F.3d 1424, 1432 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Ordinary care, in this matter as in other
departments of the law, means that degree of care which ordinarily prudent and dili-
gent men would exercise under similar circumstances." (citing Rankin v. Cooper, 149
F. 1010, 1013 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1907))); FDIC v. Wheat, 970 F.2d 124, 130-31 (5th Cir.
1992) (imposing liability based upon jury instruction requiring verdict against bank
directors if failure to exercise "due care" or "ordinary care" is found). Each of these
circuits requires a showing of gross negligence for post-FIRREA claims.
72. But see Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1125-28 (Posner, CJ., dissenting) (discussing the
various states laws regarding the liability of bank directors and officers).
73. Id. at 1127.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1126.
76. Id. at 1127.
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B. The Third Circuit Approach
In RTC v. Cityfed Financial Corp., 7 the Third Circuit addressed the
very issue previously disposed of in Gallagher-whether § 1821(k) su-
perseded the federal common law liability of directors and officers of
failed banks. In Cityfed, the Third Circuit concluded that § 1821(k)
does not supersede the federal common law rights of the Federal Liq-
uidators to pursue directors of failed federal banks. 78 The court there-
fore reversed the district court's order requiring the RTC to pursue
claims only for gross negligence.79
The Third Circuit based its holding on a plain reading of the savings
clause of § 1821(k). In so doing, the court explicitly rejected the Sev-
enth Circuit's conclusion that the savings clause only preserved the
government's rights under § 1818 to terminate the deposit insurance
of banks.80 Rather, the Cityfed court observed that in other portions
of FIRREA, Congress specifically limited other savings clauses, such
as § 1821(E)(3)(c)(ii), § 1821(c)(4), and § 1821(c)(3)(B), to certain
sources of law; Congress did not so limit the savings clause of
§ 1821(k). 81 In Patterson v. Shumate,' the Supreme Court, in fact,
interpreted a similar savings clause in precisely this manner.
Cityfed also differed with Gallagher's analysis of the legislative his-
tory of § 1821(k). In a painstaking analysis of all the available legisla-
tive history, Cityfed found two items of legislative history controlling.
The court noted:
Section 1821(k) was enacted as part of FIRREA, a massive 371-
page legislative package that had among its primary purposes, as
evident in the opening provision of the statute, "strengthen[ing] the
enforcement powers of Federal regulators of depository institu-
tions" and "strengthen[ing] the civil sanctions and criminal penalties
for defrauding or otherwise damaging the depository institutions
and their depositors." An overriding purpose in enacting this legis-
lation was to facilitate an effort to "seek out and punish those that
have committed wrongdoing in the management of the failed insti-
tutions," not to protect such directors and officers from claims of
ordinary negligence.83
The court also relied on the section-by-section report of the Senate
Banking Committee:
77. 57 F.3d 1231 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom., Atherton v. FDIC, 116 S.
Ct. 1415 (1996).
78. Id- at 1249.
79. I; see also id. at 1247 n.16 (declining to select between ordinary and gross
negligence); id. at 1249-50 n.2 (Mansmann, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (noting that the majority suggests a standard of ordinary negligence).
80. Id at 1238.
81. Id.
82. 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
83. Cityfed, 57 F.3d at 1239 (quoting President's News Conference, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 7, 1989, at D8).
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This report is consistent with other contemporaneous legislative his-
tory, and it makes clear that § 1821(k) did not disturb any claims,
available as a matter of state or federal law, that would hold direc-
tors and officers liable for conduct less culpable than gross negli-
gence: This subsection does not prevent the FDIC from pursuing
claims under State law or other applicable Federal law, if such law
permits the officers or directors of a financial institution to be sued
. . . for violating a lower standard of care, such as simple
negligence.84
Thus, the court determined that the legislative history supported the
preservation of federal common law.
Having concluded that both the plain meaning and legislative his-
tory of § 1821(k) require that all federal common law claims be pre-
served, the court next addressed whether federal common law was
superseded by § 1821(k). Because the court already found congres-
sional intent to preserve federal common law claims, and because the
entire issue of common law supersession turns on congressional in-
tent, the court's analysis was predictable. The court cited Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Higginbotham8a for the proposition that it is proper for fed-
eral common law to fill gaps left by congressional silence, but im-
proper to rewrite Congress's rules with federal common law. s The
Third Circuit's statutory analysis had already concluded that Congress
intended to preserve the Federal Liquidator's rights to proceed under
federal common law.87 Thus, consistent with the approach of Mobil
Oil, federal common law could fill the gaps left by § 1821(k).
The court also noted that before its receivership, the thrift involved
in Cityfed had a right to bring an action against its officers and direc-
tors under federal common law.ss Further, under § 1821(k), upon re-
ceivership, the Federal Liquidators obtain all the rights of City
Federal that existed prior to receivership.8s This provision, defining
the powers of the Federal Liquidators upon receivership, clearly
evinced congressional intent to preserve all preexisting common law
duties owed by directors of failed banks by operation of 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(2)(A)(i).
The Third Circuit concluded that the congressional intent underly-
ing the enactment of § 1821(k) was not to insulate directors and of-
ficers of failed banks from federal common law liability for conduct
less culpable than gross negligence. Rather, § 1821(k) was enacted to
ensure that directors and officers could not escape liability to the Fed-
eral Liquidators under the shield of state insulating statutes.90 Con-
84. Cityfed, 57 F.3d at 1241 (citing 135 Cong. Rec. S6912 (daily ed. June 19, 1989)).
85. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
86. Cityfed, 57 F.3d at 1245.
87. Id
88. Id




gress intended § 1821(k) to strengthen, not weaken, the Federal
Liquidators' ability to recover for director and officer misconduct.91
Finally, the court addressed the concern raised in Gallagher that
permitting federal common law claims would render § 1821(k)
surplusage:
Given the RTC's concession that it can only bring federal common
law claims against directors and officers of federally chartered insti-
tutions and not against their state-chartered counterparts, the an-
swer to the ... question is clear. Concluding that § 1821(k) does not
displace federal common law does not render this provision "redun-
dant, meaningless surplusage" because the RTC still needs
§ 1821(k) to bring actions for gross negligence against directors and
officers of institutions chartered in states with statutes insulating
them from such liability. 2
Accordingly, the preservation of federal common law was not incon-
sistent with § 1821(k) because the statute would still be necessary in
certain state actions.
The dissent in Cityfed urged the adoption of the Gallagher ap-
proach.93 The dissent also questioned the majority's supposed conclu-
sion that the main body of § 1821(k) does not apply to federally-
chartered thrifts.94
C. The Approach of Other Courts
Although Cityfed appears consistent with the Ninth Circuit,95 every
other circuit court that has addressed the issue directly has agreed
with Gallagher.96 The Tenth Circuit has adopted the Gallagher ap-
proach, but has assumed somewhat inconsistent positions in some
cases.
9 7
91. Id. at 1248 (citing RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 1127 (7th Cir. 1994) (Pos-
ner, C.J., dissenting) ("What would otherwise be a more stringent standard, that of
simple negligence, is diluted by interpretation of a statute intended to make the liabil-
ity of such directors more stringent.")).
92. ld. at 1249.
93. Id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 1252.
95. See FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532, 538 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508
U.S. 950 (1993); see also RTC v. Smith, 872 F. Supp. 805, 816-17 (D. Or. 1995) (hold-
ing that McSweeney preserved federal common law).
96. See RTC v. Frates, 52 F.3d 295, 297 (10th Cir. 1995); FDIC v. Bates, 42 F.3d
369, 372 (6th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357, 1359-60 (5th Cir. 1994).
97. FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 446 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
993 (1992). For example, the court read "may" as a "permissive term" that "does not
imply a limitation on the standards of officer and director liability." Id. at 446 (citing
Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 626-27 (1987) (refusing to read "may" as establishing
anything but discretionary power)). The court refused "to construe the first sentence
of the section as saying that an officer or director may only be held personally liable
for gross negligence." Id. RTC v. Frates, 52 F.3d 295 (10th Cir. 1995), which held that




The district courts have also frequently addressed the proper con-
struction of § 1821(k). 8 The results have not been consistent. Some
courts have held that § 1821(k) has no preemptive or superseding ef-
fect on the rights of the Federal Liquidators, but rather only preempts
state law to the extent that it insulates directors from liability for gross
negligence. 99 Some have held that § 1821(k) preempts federal com-
mon law, but allows state law claims even against directors of federal
banks.' Finally, some courts have held that it preempts both state
and federal law.' 0'
Surprisingly, despite courts' varying approaches to the construction
of § 1821(k) and its impact on source of law questions, no court ad-
dressing the issue has held that federal common law provides for other
than an ordinary care standard of liability for bank directors. Of
course, all of the tempest regarding § 1821(k) would be for naught if
federal common law provided a gross negligence standard of care.
D. Preexisting Common Law Approach to Bank Directors' Duty
of Care
Thus far, plaintiffs, defendants, and courts all appear to agree or
assume that federal common law provides an ordinary care standard
of liability. This section demonstrates that federal common law does
require ordinary care, and that, therefore, all of the litigation regard-
ing the viability of federal common law, despite the enactment of
§ 1821(k), really does matter.102
Both federal and state common law courts traditionally have drawn
distinctions between duties of bank directors and duties of directors of
ordinary corporations. 03 Because the banking business involves the
98. See supra note 10.
99. FDIC v. Mintz, 816 F. Supp. 1541, 1545 (S.D. Fla. 1993); FDIC v. Isham, 777 F.
Supp. 828, 832 (D. Colo. 1991).
100. RTC v. Williams, 887 F. Supp. 1415, 1419 (D. Kan. 1995); RTC v. Rahn, 854 F.
Supp. 480, 485 (W.D. Mich. 1994); FDIC v. Barham, 794 F. Supp. 187, 191 (W.D. La.
1991), affd, 995 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1993).
101. RTC v. Camhi, 861 F. Supp. 1121, 1128 (D. Conn. 1994); RTC v. O'Bear,
Overholser, Smith & Huffer, 840 F. Supp. 1270, 1275 (N.D. Ind. 1993); FDIC v.
Swager, 773 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (D. Mmn. 1991).
102. See RTC v. Cityfed Fmn. Corp., 57 F.3d 1231, 1247 n.16 (3d Cir. 1995); RTC v.
Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 1127 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, CJ., dissenting).
103. Henry W. Ballantine, Ballantine on Corporations 158 (2d ed. 1946) (rejecting
gross negligence standard for directors generally, and noting higher standard of care
for bank directors); 3A William M. Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Pri-
vate Corporations § 1042.10 (perm. ed. rev. vol 1994) (stating that the standard of
care for bank directors requires a "strong emphasis on supervision and attention to
the bank's business" (citing Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 165-66 (1891); Martin v.
Webb, 110 U.S. 7, 15 (1884))); Norman D. Lattin, The Law of Corporations 279
(1971) (noting that directors' duties are particularly demanding in the context of
banks); McCoy, supra note 8, at 1033 ("Courts have scrutinized a wide array of
substantive bank decisions for negligence out of concern for undue risk to depositors
and deposit insurance funds."); see also I Michael P. Malloy, Banking Law and Regu-
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custody of public funds and normally implies an assurance of safety
and soundness in the use of those funds,1V 4 courts have long ago set a
higher duty of care for directors of banks.'0 5 Directors of banks are
guardians of shareholder funds and public depositor funds. The justi-
fication for protecting depositors applies equally to protecting the de-
posit insurance fund guaranteed by the federal government.
First, like the public depositors, the deposit insurance fund does not
have the ability to negotiate independently with directors. Directors
of federally-insured banks are selected by the shareholders and other
equity-holders of the financial institution, not the federal deposit in-
surance fund. Therefore, there is no basis for limiting the traditionally
high duty of care imposed upon bank directors, because the risk for-
merly borne by depositors is now borne by a deposit insurance fund.
Second, to the extent that deposit insurance shields the depositors
from risk of loss, the government should be and is subrogated to the
rights of the depositors; in other words, the government has stepped
into the shoes of depositors.10 6
Courts have also recognized the crucial role banks play in a mod-
em, industrialized economy. When a bank approaches insolvency or
becomes insolvent, public confidence can be shaken and catastrophic
bank runs may occur. Declining deposits may, in turn, lead to less
lending, higher interest rates, and consequential damage to the gen-
eral economy.10 7 In fact, FIRREA was enacted in the face of this very
lation § 3.2.6 (1995 & Supp. 1996) (stating that bank managers are held liable for
negligence). Some authorities have stated that directors of financial institutions owe
only the same duty of reasonable care as directors of other corporations, but then
proceed to impose liability through a stricter application of that duty. McDonnell v.
American Leduc Petroleums, Ltd., 491 F.2d 380, 383 (2d Cir. 1974). The nomencla-
ture is confusing, especially when the business judgment rule is added to the mix, and
the distinction appears to be one of form over substance. The end result is that direc-
tors of banks have traditionally been held to stricter accountability regarding the duty
of care. William L. Cary & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporations 576 (7th ed., una-
bridged 1995); see, e.g., Gadd v. Pearson, 351 F. Supp. 895, 903 (M.D. Fla. 1972) ("Of-
ficers and directors of banking corporations generally owe a greater duty than other
corporate officers and directors."); Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Supp. 105, 116 (W.D. Ky.
1951) (holding that directors of financial institutions are held to a higher standard of
care than other corporate directors); Broderick v. Marcus, 272 N.Y.S. 455, 461 (Sup.
Ct. 1934) (same).
104. Fletcher, supra note 103, § 1042.10.
105. Id § 1042 (citing cases in which the courts held bank directors to "a stricter
accountability" than directors of other corporations). A depositor has never been
viewed as an ordinary creditor. In fact, banks have been allowed to solicit the invest-
ment of depositors because of the traditional implied assurance of safety that demand
deposits entail.
106. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(g) (1994).
107. FSLIC v. Huff, 704 P.2d 372, 379 (Kan. 1985) ("[Plotentiality for [economic]
harm ... from mismanagement of savings and loan associations is enormous."); see
also E.G. Corrigan, Are Banks Special?: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 1982
Annual Report, reprinted in Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Banking Law
and Regulation 68, 69-73 (1992) (noting that banks are instruments of monetary pol-
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problem.'08 Thus, courts have recognized that public policy requires
that bank directors be held to strict accountability for negligent
decisions.1°9
The public policy requiring prudence and soundness in the opera-
tion of federally-insured banks is evidenced by the statutory scheme
regulating an insured bank's activities as a quid pro quo of deposit
insurance. In fact, that statutory scheme specifically imposes upon
bank directors the obligation to act in a safe and sound manner. n 0
Arguably this statutory standard of care is even higher than the com-
mon law standard of care requiring bank directors to act with ordinary
care.' Regardless of this potential distinction, there clearly is no ba-
sis for undercutting this statutory framework for monitoring banks by
easing the standard of care that has traditionally been required of
icy, recognizing the unique position of banks in supplying liquidity and credit, and
concluding that banks should be heavily regulated to assure that failures are avoided).
108. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Savings and Loan Widirawals in December a Record
$8.1 Billion, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1989, at 1.
109. E.g., Wichita Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Black, 781 P.2d 707,712 (Kan. 1989)
(affirming that bank directors play a special role in the economy and imposing liabil-
ity for negligence); Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71 (1880) (stating that bank directors owe
a higher duty because even a "breath of suspicion" could cause a bank run and de-
stroy the bank); Broderick v. Marcus, 272 N.Y.S. 455, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (stating that
maintenance of safe and sound banking is essential to "help the wheels of industry
revolve"); see also 6 Zolman Cavitch, Business Organizations § 1207.01l] (1995)
("Directors of banks ... are held to stricter accountability than directors of other
types of corporations, because of their special relationship to depositors and the gen-
eral public."); Robert S. Stevens, Handbook on the Law of Private Corporations
§ 151 (1949) (noting that the director's standard of liability is ordinary care and that
amount of care depends upon the character of the corporation; in "banking and insur-
ance companies, there is a public interest in maintaining careful and efficient manage-
ment"). Any doubts regarding the need for special protection of the banking
industry, can be resolved by a primer on the Great Depression: "Most people re-
member vaguely that a banking crisis helped tip the world into the Great Depression
of the 1930s, with all its horrifying consequences for the second half of the century."
How Safe is Your Bank?, supra note 9, at 15. While Nazism and Communism seem
only remotely related to pervasively sloppy banking, a system-wide bank panic can
have a "devastating effect on the real economy." Coping with the Ups and Downs,
supra note 9, at 4. As banks fail, credit tightens and loans are called. In the 1930s,
when 9000 banks failed in America, a world-wide credit crunch "made the Depression
'Great"' Id.
110. Lawrence G. Baxter, Fiduciary Issues in Federal Banking Regulation, 56 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 7, 8 (1993) (stating that the "long standing (and] reasonably well
understood ... duty not to engage in 'unsafe and unsound' conduct" protects the
deposit insurance fund more than any fiduciary duty running directly to the insurance
fund (emphasis omitted)). No case has found the safe and sound banking mandates
of the statutory regime to support a private right of action by a bank, or its successors,
the Federal Liquidators, against its directors; this issue only becomes relevant if a duty
of ordinary care is obliterated by the judiciary in the context of applying § 1821(k).
111. Heidi M. Schooner, Fiduciary Duties' Demanding Cousin: Bank Director Lia-
bility for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 175,214 (1995)
(concluding that the application of safety and soundness principles results in a higher
standard of care for directors).
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bank directors.112 It is illogical to argue that, because the federal gov-
ernment insures deposits and, therefore regulates risks, the tradition-
ally high duty of care required of bank directors or officers should be
lessened. To lessen the duty of care defeats the whole purpose of reg-
ulation-to reduce risk-and imposes excessive monitoring costs
upon taxpayers. Thus, the Supreme Court has long held that the de-
tailed statutory scheme of bank regulation did not operate to lessen
the common law duty of ordinary care."13
1. Federal Common Law
Despite a certain revisionism 14 regarding the precise standard of
care applied to bank directors prior to the enactment of FIRREA,
federal common law courts have always applied an ordinary care stan-
dard. The long-standing common law tradition imposed duties of due
care upon bank directors with little, if any, allowance for the opera-
tion of the business judgment rule." 5 Uniformly the cases state that
112. But see Ronald W. Stevens & Bruce H. Nielson, The Standard of Care for
Directors and Officers of Federally Chartered Depository Institutions: It's Gross Negli-
gence Regardless of Whether Section 1821(k) Preempts Federal Common Law, 13 Ann.
Rev. Banking L. 169, 178-86 (1994) (discussing the lack of federal case law regarding
the standard of negligence required for director and officer liability and concluding
that federal common law should be developed through the incorporation of state law,
which sets a standard of at least gross negligence). The authors' analysis is curious.
First, the authors claim there is confusion as to whether the standard of liability for
bank directors is gross negligence or ordinary negligence under federal common law;
yet, the authors cite no federal common-law authority that states or holds that bank
directors are liable only for gross negligence, and they admit that federal common law
authorities have universally invoked an "ordinary prudence and diligence" standard.
Id. at 186. Second, while arguing for a gross negligence standard of liability under
federal common law authorities, the authors ignore the numerous federal cases that
hold that allegations of mere negligence are sufficient to state a claim against bank
directors. See FDIC v. Mason, 115 F.2d 548, 551-52 (3d Cir. 1940) (reversing dismissal
of claims alleging violations of bank directors' duties for failure to exercise "ordinary
prudence"); Hughes v. Reed, 46 F.2d 435, 437 (10th Cir. 1931) (reversing dismissal of
claims of "improvident" lending decisions); Robinson v. Hall, 63 F. 222, 228 (4th Cir.
1894) (reversing dismissal of claims against negligent bank directors). Under the
gross negligence standard divined by the authors, these cases would have been dis-
missed for improper pleading. Third, the authors' reliance on their own value-laden
analysis of the facts underlying the federal common law authorities ignores a funda-
mental canon of our litigation system; it is for the finder of fact to determine if a given
legal standard is breached as is the issue of what constitutes ordinary care. See Warner
v. Penoyer, 91 F. 587, 593 (2d Cir. 1898) ("[E]ach case has to be determined in view of
all the circumstances." (citation omitted)). It makes no sense to urge a change in the
legal standard of liability based upon the authors' perception of specific factual appli-
cations of the standard of liability.
113. Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 94 (1919) (holding that the Na-
tional Bank Act did not obviate directors' duty of ordinary care); Bowerman v.
Hamner, 250 U.S. 504, 511-12 (1919) (same).
114. See supra note 112.
115. See, e.g., FDIC v. Wheat, 970 F.2d 124, 130-31 n.13 (5th Cir. 1992) (approvingjury instruction for business judgment rule requiring exercise of "due care" or "ordi-
nary care" for protection of the nile); RTC v. Gladstone, 895 F. Supp. 356, 369 (D.
Mass. 1995) (holding that the business judgment rule only protects decisions under-
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taken with "due care"); see also McCoy, supra note 8, at 1032 ("[S]cholars thus have
failed to grasp the vast extent to which courts have second-guessed decisions of bank
directors on the merits ... for the past hundred years."). But see Washington Bancorp.
v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256, 1267-68 (D.D.C. 1993) (applying business judgment rule
and gross negligence standard to bank directors).
The recent transmogrification of the business judgment rule adds to the ability of
some commentators to create confusion regarding the standard of liability of bank
directors. Traditionally, the business judgment rule operated in a majority of jurisdic-
tions to protect decisions of directors made with a reasonable basis and with due care.
As such, the business judgment rule merely precluded liability for decisions that
turned sour if the decision process was reasonably sound. See Ballantine, supra note
103, § 63a (noting that the business judgment rule presupposes that reasonable dili-
gence and care have been exercised); Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law § 3.4 (1986)
(stating that the business judgment rule should only protect judgments arrived at in a
non-negligent manner); Harry G. Henn & John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations
§ 242 (3d ed. 1983) (stating that the business judgment rule presupposes an honest,
unbiased judgment reasonably exercised); see also McDonnell v. American Leduc Pe-
troleums, Ltd., 491 F.2d 380, 384 (2d Cir. 1974) ("The business judgment rule protects
only reasonable acts of a director or officer."). Nevertheless, "[c]ourts have been far
too lenient in their treatment of directors who do not direct under whatever rule they
adopt as a test of liability." Lattin, supra note 103, at 274. In fact, Professor Joseph
Bishop, Jr. found that "[t]he hard fact is that cases in which directors of business
corporations are held liable, at the suit of stockholders, for mere negligence are few
and far between." Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 Yale L.J. 1078,
1095 (1968) (emphasis added). This apparent divergence between the law and re-
ported decisions has given ostensible support to a reformulation of the business judg-
ment rule, essentially extending the rule to substantively insulate directors from
liability. Compare ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restate-
ment and Recommendations § 4.01 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1982) (imposing liability
for negligently made decisions) with ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance and
Structure: Analysis and Recommendations §§ 4.01, 4.02 (1994) (imposing liability
only for irrational decisions).
Even assuming that it is appropriate to modify legal doctrine based upon an as-
sumption that courts are disingenuous regarding the standard of liability they articu-
late and a value-laden factual analysis of the outcomes of only reported decisions,
however, this reasoning has no applicability to banks. Professor Bishop himself noted
that decisions imposing liability upon directors for negligence involved "special" cate-
gories or circumstances, such as cases involving banks, particularly insolvent banks
where recoveries would benefit depositors rather than shareholders. Bishop, supra, at
1095. There is only scant authority for applicability of a business judgment rule re-
quiring more than negligent decision processes for liability in the banking context. See
McCoy, supra note 8.
The pronounced trend away from a standard of liability conducive to director liabil-
ity for negligence has manifested itself in many jurisdictions through an explicit adop-
tion of a gross negligence standard of liability, most notably in Delaware. See Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). The use of a gross negligence standard
had long been a minority, and even discredited, position. Lattin, supra note 103, at
274.
The use of the term gross negligence in connection with the banking industry may
be particularly misleading. Many authorities have stated that "[w]hat would be prop-
erly regarded as slight negligence in a director of a railroad or manufacturing com-
pany might well be regarded as gross negligence in the case of a bank." Ballantine,
supra note 103, at 158. Thus, when courts use the term gross negligence in connection
with banks it could well reflect the application of a more rigorous ordinary care stan-
dard. See Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 72 (1880). Stated simply, the standard of liability
for bank directors is so rigorous that acts of negligence are considered grossly negli-
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bank directors and officers owe a duty of "utmost diligence," "ordi-
nary care," "ordinary diligence," or "proper prudence."" 6 In all
events, these formulations of the standard of care must be deemed an
ordinary negligence approach. Moreover, the cases articulate no real
business judgment rule in contrast to cases from the same era involv-
ing non-banking corporations." 7
Many of these cases are dated well before Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins."' Theoretically, under pre-Erie law, the common law ap-
plied in federal courts could have provided a totally different standard
of care than the common law applied in state courts. In fact, there is a
gent. See Preston v. Prather, 137 U.S. 604, 608-09 (1891) (stating that gross negligence
is nothing more than failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances);
Wallace v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 15 S.W. 448, 453-54 (Tenn. 1891) (stating that if bank
directors are "inattentive" to their duties, they are guilty of "gross neglect" and that
bank directors are liable for acts of negligence).
Additionally, long ago most bank directors apparently served without compensa-
tion. The fiduciary duties of gratuitous agents have always been more lax than those
who are compensated. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 388 (1958). Therefore,
as could be expected, some cases express reluctance to hold gratuitous bank directors
liable for conduct short of gross negligence. E.g., Wheeler v. Aiken County Loan &
Say. Bank, 75 F. 781, 785 (D.S.C. 1896) (stating that bank directors "[b]eing gratui-
tous mandataries ... are only liable for fraud or gross negligence"); see also Swentzel
v. Penn Bank, 23 A. 405, 414 (Pa. 1892) ("It cannot be the rule that the director of a
bank is to be held to the same ordinary care that he takes of his own affairs. He
receives no compensation for his services. He is a gratuitous mandatary."); see also
generally Albert S. Bolles, The Duty and Liability of Bank Directors, 12 Yale LJ. 287,
289 (1903) (stating that despite formulations invoking an ordinary care standard of
liability, facts usually indicate that liability is imposed under general common law only
for gross negligence because bank directors are "rarely paid"). Thus, authorities from
this era which purport to uphold a gross negligence standard must be viewed skepti-
cally because of the widespread conviction that bank directors served gratuitously.
This Article takes no position regarding the duties of gratuitous bank directors.
At some point, however, authorities began to recognize that directors were usually
compensated in both monetary and non-monetary means, and the approach to the
question of duty was modified accordingly.
116. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1891) ("There are many things which,
in their management, require the utmost diligence .... [T]he duties imposed are
presumed to call for nothing more than ordinary care .... "); Hughes v. Reed, 46 F.2d
435, 437 (10th Cir. 1931) ("[T]he defendants failed faithfully and diligently to dis-
charge their duties as directors ...."); Warner v. Penoyer, 91 F. 587, 592 (2d Cir.
1898) (requiring "ordinary prudence" for bank directors); Rankin v. Cooper, 149 F.
1010, 1013 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1907) ("It is their duty to use ordinary diligence in ascer-
taining the condition of its business, and to exercise reasonable control and supervi-
sion over its affairs."); Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 74 (1880) (stating that directors of
banks must use "proper care and diligence").
117. See Fletcher, supra note 103, § 1042.10, at 77 ("[T]he business judgment rule,
with some exceptions, is usually not invoked as a defense against bank director liabil-
ity for mismanagement."). Compare Leslie V. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 365 (N.Y. 1888)
(finding that "[m]ere errors of judgment" are not sufficient to support liability) with
Hun, 82 N.Y. at 72 (holding bank directors to stricter duty of care). But see Amerifirst
Bank v. Bomar, 757 F. Supp. 1365, 1376 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that allegations of
fraud, recklessness, and negligence were sufficient to overcome bank directors' busi-
ness judgment rule defense on a motion to dismiss).
118. 304 U.S. 64, cert. denied, 305 U.S. 637 (1938).
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remarkable similarity in approach. Regardless of a bank's jurisdiction
of incorporation, or the jurisdiction deciding the case, one message
was loud and clear: bank directors are subject to a standard of liabil-
ity of ordinary care. 19
Some commentators have urged that the courts should not be taken
at face value when they discuss the bank director's duty of care in
terms of ordinary negligence. 120 These commentators have urged
that, in fact, a gross negligence standard was applied notwithstanding
a court's explicit statement of a simple negligence standard. 12 Even a
cursory review of the cases, however, belies this argument.
Bates v. Dresser,122 a Supreme Court case that predates Erie, illus-
trates the federal common law approach to bank director and officer
liability. In Bates, the receiver of a national bank sued the directors
for losses incurred as a result of theft by an employee.'2 3 Although
the court did not impose liability upon the outside directors for failing
to detect a novel fraud, the court held the president liable for negli-
gence.124 Justice Holmes affirmed the circuit court judgment for the
outside directors stating that the "fraud was a novelty in the way of
swindling a bank so far as the knowledge ... had reached [in] ...
1910."1' In fact, the fraud had even escaped the detection of federal
bank examiners."2 Still, the Court concluded that the president
should have affirmatively investigated unexplained shortages.12 7 De-
spite the novelty of the well-concealed fraud, two Supreme Court jus-
tices, and the district court, wanted to hold even the outside directors
liable for negligence.' 2s In imposing liability on the president, Justice
Holmes relied upon federal common law authorities which had long
stated that bank directors owe duties of ordinary prudence.12 9 Thus,
Bates demonstrates that federal common law, as articulated by the
Supreme Court as early as 1884, imposed liability on negligent manag-
ers of federal banks. 130
119. See Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 1943) (holding directors
negligent under federal common law); Fletcher, supra note 103, § 1042.10, at 77.
120. Stevens & Nielson, supra note 112, at 186.
121. 1&
122. 251 U.S. 524 (1920).
123. Id at 526.
124. Id. at 529-31.
125. Id. at 529.
126. I& at 528.
127. Idt at 530-31.
128. Id. at 532.
129. Id. at 530 (citing Warner v. Penoyer, 91 F. 587, 592 (2d Cir. 1898), and holding
directors liable for neglect of proper supervision).
130. The Supreme Court articulated a common law standard of care for directors
and officers of federally-chartered depository institutions over 100 years ago in Briggs
v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891) ("In any view the degree of care to which these
defendants were bound is that which ordinarily prudent and diligent men would exer-
cise under similar circumstances .... "). Briggs arose before Erie; thus, although
addressing the liability of directors and officers of a nationally-chartered bank, it did
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Federal decisions following Bates demonstrate the high degree of
care that federal common law imposed upon directors. For example,
in Gamble v. Brown,'3' the Fourth Circuit imposed liability upon
outside directors of a national bank for failing to exercise reasonable
care in protecting the bank from embezzlement by appointing an au-
dit committee. 32 The court articulated the standard of care as "that
which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circum-
stances."'1 33 In Atherton v. Anderson,'34 the court held outside direc-
tors liable for failing to detect the deteriorating condition of the bank
because of the president's affirmative scheme to deceive the board. 135
The court rejected the directors' defense that they were ignorant of
the facts because directors have a "duty to know the facts."'1 36 In
Hughes v. Reed, 37 the Tenth Circuit reversed the dismissal of claims
that national bank directors had negligently approved certain loans. 138
The court specifically found that allegations that the directors failed to
"faithfully and diligently" discharge their duties and protect the bank
from "improvident" loans were sufficient to state a cause of action.139
not label the articulated standard as one of federal common law. Such a distinction,
however, is immaterial to the issue of the duty of care of a bank director. All com-
mon law authorities imposed essentially the same duty of ordinary care. It is true that
Briggs, as well as other cases, held that the particular directors at issue were not cul-
pable. The primary basis for this conclusion, however, was that the Court did not
desire to impose a duty upon directors to review a bank's books and records. Id. at
163-64. In other words, the Court simply required some basis for the directors to have
notice of dangerous conditions.
Similarly, some courts have found that the conduct at issue was not just negligent,
but grossly so. Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504, 511 (1919); see Stevens & Nielson,
supra note 112, at 183-87. Nevertheless, the standard remained the same. Certainly,
these courts knew that gross negligence was available as a standard of care. Despite
the grossly negligent conduct at issue, the courts nonetheless specified, and therefore
reaffirmed, a standard of ordinary care. See Anderson v. Atherton, 302 U.S. 643, 643
(1937) (reversing the circuit court and directing it to determine bank directors' "com-
mon law liability for negligence"); Bowerman, 250 U.S. at 513 (holding director liable
for breaching duty to act in accordance with the conduct of "ordinarily prudent and
diligent men, accepting election to membership in a bank directorate"); Martin v.
Webb, 110 U.S. 7, 15 (1884) (stating that bank directors have a duty "to use ordinary
diligence in ascertaining the condition of [a bank's] business, and to exercise reason-
able control and supervision of its officers."); see also Preston v. Prather, 137 U.S. 604,
615 (1891) (holding bank managers liable for failure to exercise "ordinary care" and
rejecting gross negligence standard where bank was apparently operated as a
partnership).
131. 29 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 839 (1929).
132. Gamble, 29 F.2d at 371-72 (finding directors "culpable" for their "neglect" in
appointing an auditing committee).
133. IL at 370.
134. 99 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1938) (imposing liability for improvident loans despite
Master's findings to the contrary).
135. IL at 888-91.
136. Id at 889.
137. 46 F.2d 435 (10th Cir. 1931).
138. Id at 443; see Robinson v. Hall, 63 F. 222, 223 (4th Cir. 1894) (reversing dis-
missal of claims against negligent directors).
139. Hughes, 46 F.2d at 437.
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Gibbons v. Anderson 40 imposed liability for "negligence" upon direc-
tors for failing to heed warnings that the primary managing officer was
diverting funds to his own use.141 Clearly, these courts applied an or-
dinary negligence standard and imposed liability for losses caused by
another's intentional misconduct.
Therefore, even discounting the Supreme Court's explicit state-
ments regarding the duty of care expected from a bank or a financial
institution director, it appears that federal common law courts, sitting
as trier of fact in an equity context, found negligent conduct to give
rise to liability for breach of the duty of ordinary care.
2. State Common Law
State common law has long been consistent with the duty of ordi-
nary care imposed in the federal courts. In Litwin v. Allen, 42 the New
York Court of Appeals recognized that directors of banking institu-
tions held a special public trust because of their custody over deposi-
tors' as well as shareholders' assets, and owe a higher duty of care
than directors of an ordinary business corporation. 4 3 Litwin imposed
liability based upon a conclusion that a board business decision was
negligent; specifically, the bank at issue bore the risk of capital loss
with no prospect for capital gain when purchasing convertible deben-
tures.'" The great weight of other state decisions has stated the same
rule and found liability in situations involving negligence."-'
140. 80 F. 345 (W.D. Mich. 1897).
141. Id. at 349 (stating that directors may not simply confide the operations of a
bank to trusted officers).
142. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1940).
143. Id- at 727.
144. Id. at 699-700.
145. Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893, 896 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying Oklahoma law and
requiring "ordinary care"); Magale v. Fomby, 201 S.W. 278, 280 (Ark. 1918) (holding
that unsecured loans to new business ventures were negligent); Chicago Title & Trust
Co. v. Munday, 131 N.E. 103, 105 (111. 1921) (holding that "when one takes a position
as a director of a bank he becomes trustee for the depositors as well as for the stock-
holders, and is bound to the observance of ordinary care and diligence"); Wichita Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Black, 781 P.2d 707, 712 (Kan. 1989) (imposing "stricter" duty
of care upon bank officers and directors); First Nat'l Bank v. Doherty, 161 S.W. 211,
214 (Ky. 1913) (stating that banking industry demands "exceptionally" high duties of
directors); Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 197 N.E. 649 (Mass. 1935); Prudential
Trust Co. v. Brown, 171 N.E. 42, 44 (Mass. 1930); Williams v. McKay, 18 A. 824, 828(N.J. Ch. 1889) (holding an ordinary care and prudence standard to apply to bank
directors); Neese v. Brown, 405 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tenn. 1964) (holding that general
allegations of negligence against directors of a trust company are sufficient to state a
claim); Green v. Officers & Directors of Knoxville Banking & Trust Co., 182 S.W.
244,249 (Tenn. 1915) (holding that allegations of simple negligence were sufficient to
overrule demurrer); Wallace v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 15 S.W. 448, 453-54 (Tenn. 1891)
(stating that negligence is sufficient for liability); Warren v. Robison, 57 P. 287,290-91
(Utah 1899) (requiring even unpaid directors to exercise reasonable prudence); Mar-
shall v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Say. Bank, 8 S.E. 586, 590 (Va. 1889) (holding direc-
tors personally liable for their negligence); see also Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432
A.2d 814, 829 (NJ. 1981) (holding that a bank director is negligent and personally
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3. Modem Federal Common Law
Modem federal courts have consistently applied a common law
duty of ordinary care for liability to attach to bank directors. For ex-
ample, the Seventh Circuit in FDIC v. Bierman4 6 imposed liability
upon directors of a failed bank under federal common law authorities
for failure to exercise "reasonable control and supervision over its af-
fairs."' 47 The court held the directors liable for a series of loan trans-
actions that were approved by the bank. 4 ' Bierman relied upon the
formulation of a bank director's duties set out by the Supreme Court
in Briggs v. Spaulding as a starting point for its decision. 49
Finally, pre-FIRREA federal courts were unanimous with respect
to a core issue, i.e., how a jury should be instructed to resolve a dis-
pute regarding mismanagement of a bank. For example, in FDIC v.
Wheat, 50 the Fifth Circuit upheld a jury verdict against failed bank
directors even though the jury instructions required only a finding that
the board did not exercise "ordinary care. "15' Similarly, in FDIC v.
Appling, 52 the Tenth Circuit upheld a jury instruction that was essen-
liable for failure to prevent misappropriation of funds by other directors who were
also officers and shareholders of the corporation, thereby imposing a stricter standard
of accountability than that for a director of an ordinary corporation). But see Wash-
ington Bancorp. v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256, 1266 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that bank
directors must satisfy either a simple negligence or a gross negligence standard of care
depending on the circumstances in which they operate during any given act).
146. 2 F.3d 1424 (7th Cir. 1993).
147. l at 1432 (citing Rankin v. Cooper, 149 F. 1010, 1013 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1907));
see also Fitzpatrick v. FDIC, 765 F.2d 569, 576 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming FDIC en-
forcement decision and finding breach of duty of ordinary care under federal law);
Hoehn v. Crews, 144 F.2d 665, 673 (10th Cir. 1944) (applying an ordinarily prudent
person standard of liability but finding no proximate cause or negligence), aff'd sub
nom., Garber v. Crews, 324 U.S. 200 (1945); Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409, 417
(2d Cir. 1943) (holding a bank director liable and stating that directors' standard of
liability requires that bank directors "exercise that degree of care which ordinarily
diligent and prudent men would exercise under the circumstances"); FDIC v. Mason,
115 F.2d 548, 551-52 (3d Cir. 1940) (reversing dismissal of claims against bank direc-
tors for failing to exercise ordinary prudence to prevent embezzlement by an assistant
cashier); FDIC v. Greenwood, 739 F. Supp. 450, 452 (C.D. Ill. 1989) (ordering jury
instructions requiring directors to exercise degree of care of "reasonably prudent di-
rector" of a bank); FSLIC v. Kidwell, 716 F. Supp. 1315, 1317 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (find-
ing that federal common law requires bank directors to act with ordinary prudence),
vacated in part sub nom., Eureka Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Kidwell, 937 F.2d 612 (9th
Cir. 1991); FDIC v. Butcher, 660 F. Supp. 1274, 1279 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (stating that
common law held bank directors liable for mere negligence); Anderson v. Akers, 7 F.
Supp. 924, 928 (W.D. Ky. 1934) (imposing liability upon directors for failure to act as
"reasonably prudent" bank directors), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom., Atherton v.
Anderson, 86 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1936), rev'd, 302 U.S. 643 (1937).
148. Bierman, 2 F.3d at 1437.
149. Id at 1432. Ironically, although Bierman was a pre-FIRREA decision, Bier-
man was decided only three months prior to the Gallagher court's evisceration of the
federal common law standards stated in Bierman.
150. 970 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1992).
151. Itt at 131 n.13.
152. 992 F.2d 1109 (10th Cir. 1993).
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tially identical to the ordinary care formulation in Wheat.153 Virtually
all of the post-Erie, pre-FIRREA federal courts took the same ap-
proach as the courts in Bierman, Appling, and Wheat."5
The long-standing duty of ordinary care for bank directors, recog-
nized by both state and federal common law, suggests that courts
should not surmise that Congress intended to obliterate federal com-
mon law. Similarly, because this common law duty has existed in tan-
dem with pervasive banking regulation for so long, courts should not
lightly conclude that Congress intended to supersede federal common
law. Thus, the federal common law provides for a standard of liability
of ordinary care, and the longevity and nature of this authority
strongly suggests that those asserting that § 1821(k) eliminates federal
common law have a difficult argument to make.155
E. Did Directors and Officers Understand and Bargain for Duties
to Exercise Ordinary Care?
Whether directors understood and bargained for the duty to exer-
cise due care is a significant issue separate from the legal duty itself.
If, in fact, directors and officers did bargain for and assume a duty of
due care, relieving negligent directors from financial liability that de-
rives from that duty by the magic of statutory interpretation is effec-
tively a subsidy. Because the government insures only deposits, not
negligent directors and officers, it would be strange indeed to find that
the political branches, without discussion or debate, defeated direc-
tors' and officers' settled expectations and gave negligent directors
such a subsidy in the face of a historic bank crisis.
Every director of a national bank or federal thrift is required to
take an oath of office.' 56 The oath requires that the director "will...
diligently and honestly administer the affairs" of the bank.' 57 State-
chartered, federally-insured banks also frequently require a similar
oath.158 Although courts have held that the oath does not rise to the
level of a contract, the substance of the oath certainly puts bank direc-
tors on notice that merely avoiding gross negligence is insufficient.
153. Id at 1113.
154. See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 103, 113, 115, 116, 122-41, 146-53 and accompanying text.
156. 12 U.S.C. § 73 (1994). The point is not that directors can be sued based upon
violations of their oath. E.g., Davis v. McFarland, 15 F.2d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1926)
(finding no liability for negligence under oath requirement imposed by predecessor to
§ 73), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 754 (1927); Thompson v. Kerr, 555 F. Supp. 1090, 1097
(S.D. Ohio 1982) (denying recovery under § 73). Rather, the point is that federal
bank directors knowingly bargained for duties of ordinary care.
157. 12 U.S.C. § 73.
158. See Cal. Fin. Code § 682 (West 1989); 205 nM Comp. Stat. § 5/16 (Supp. 1996);
Iowa Code Ann. § 524.611 (West 1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 9-1118 (1991); Miss. Code
Ann. § 81-12-83 (1972) (requiring state-chartered thrift directors to take an oath).
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In addition, there are several guidelines that inform directors and
officers of their duties. For example, on May 8, 1985, the FHLBB, the
primary thrift regulator prior to FIRREA, published interpretative
guidelines,'59 referred to as Memorandum R-62, that addressed a di-
rector's responsibilities. Generally, Memorandum R-62 states that di-
rectors have broad fiduciary duties "to exercise reasonable care and
due diligence" in supervising the management of their institution's af-
fairs. The publication then details how a thrift board member dis-
charges this duty in the context of the banking industry.
Memorandum R-62 cites case law, such as Joy v. North,60 which held
directors liable for damages caused by the breach of the broad duties
that the FHLBB detailed. This memorandum was published in the
United States League Federal Guide, the primary trade publication
for the thrift industry. Moreover, the FHLBB routinely provided
these types of guidelines to insured S&Ls.1 6 1
Additionally, on August 2, 1977, the FHLBB issued Memorandum
R-42,161 which set forth detailed guidelines that directors should fol-
low when setting officer compensation. The board stated that, in es-
tablishing fees to be paid to members of the board, each director
should be keenly aware of his fiduciary responsibilities, and directors
should understand that their "primary responsibilities [are] to estab-
lish policies which will protect the assets of the association.""' These
detailed standards belie a gross negligence duty.
Furthermore, on April 19, 1982, the FHLBB published detailed ap-
praisal guidelines for the management of federally-insured thrifts.'a
159. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Memorandum R-62 Director's Responsibili-
ties: FI-ILBB Guidelines; Procedures for Obtaining Information to Support Direc-
tors' Decisions (1985), reprinted in United States League of Savings Institutions,
United States League Federal Guide 9869 (July 1985) [hereinafter Memorandum R-
62]. Courts have occasionally relied upon Memorandum R-62 in defining a bank di-
rector's standard of conduct. Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1127, 1149 (D. Kan.),
reconsideration denied, 810 F. Supp. 1172 (1992). The FHLBB, and its successor
agency, the OTS, have been given plenary authority by Congress to regulate the inter-
nal affairs of federally-chartered savings associations. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (1995).
As such, the courts should defer to its policy statements in articulating the content of
federal common law, at least for federal thrifts.
160. 692 F.2d 880, 897 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom., Citytrust v. Joy, 460
U.S. 1051 (1983).
161. See Haralson v. FHLBB, 678 F. Supp. 925, 926-27 (D.D.C. 1987) (finding that
Memorandum R-41b was provided to all insured savings and loans).
162. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Memorandum R-42 FHLBB Guidelines for
Determining the Reasonableness of Compensation and Fees Paid to Officers, Direc-
tors and Attorneys (1977), reprinted in United States League of Savings Associations,
United States League Federal Guide 8227-17 (Apr. 1982), available in Westlaw,
FFIN-OTS Database.
163. Id
164. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Memorandum R-41b, Appraisal Policies
and Practices of Insured Institutions and Service Corporations (1982), reprinted in
United States League of Savings Institutions, United States League Federal Guide
8227-15 (Apr. 1982). Courts have relied upon these appraisal guidelines in assessing
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Because most thrifts' assets consisted of real estate loans, these guide-
lines applied to the primary business of every S&L. The detailed
guidelines regarding appraisals demanded a degree of involvement by
management far beyond that contemplated by a gross negligence stan-
dard. The appraisal guidelines cover issues ranging from the amount
of information required in an appraisal to mandatory procedures for
reviewing appraisals. On September 11, 1986, Memorandum R-41b
was superseded by Memorandum R-41c.165 Memorandum R-41c pro-
vided even more stringent standards for appraisals and specified that
the duty to assure appropriate appraisals rests not just on manage-
ment generally, but specifically upon the board of directors.'"6
The banking industry is also the subject of many trade publications,
which traditionally have supplied directors with an enormous volume
of material detailing the duties of directors.16 7 These publications dis-
cussed challenges facing directors in the newly deregulated banking
industry and reminded directors of their duty of care.'" These trade
publications also contained periodic discussions of legal developments
which included recent cases where director duties were litigated. 69
These duties were always cast in terms of ordinary care. Thus, direc-
tors and officers of banks have access to numerous sources informing
them of their duty of ordinary care.
Although industry publications, regulatory guidelines, and oaths
certainly informed directors of their duties, the directors' knowledge
of the legal authorities defining their duties should not be discounted.
liability of directors. RTC v. Heiserman, 839 F. Supp. 1457, 1466 (D. Colo. 1993)(finding a federal common law cause of action for violation of Memorandum R-41b);
RTC v. Gladstone, 895 F. Supp. 356, 370 (D. Mass. 1995) (same).
165. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Memorandum R-41c Appraisal Policies and
Practices of Insured Institutions and Service Corporations (1986).
166. Id
167. E.g., Robert E. Barnett, Bank and Bank Holding Company Directors 9 (1991)
("Directors have a duty to use ordinary care and prudence in the administration of
[the bank]."); Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, The Director's Book. The
Role of a National Bank Director 56 (1987) (stating that bank directors have a duty to
act with ordinary diligence); ABA, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. Law. 1591, 1604 (1978) (stating that
directors are liable for decisions that lack a reasonable basis); see also John P. Austin,
Directors of Financial Institutions: Special Problems, 31 Bus. Law. 1243, 1245 (1976)
(stating that bank directors are required to act with "ordinary care and diligence");
Weinstock, supra note 31, at 436-42 (explaining statutory and common law violations
for bank directors to avoid). Many of these publications are published on a regular, if
not periodic, basis. See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821 n.1 (NJ.
1981) (citing Robert E. Barnett, Responsibilities & Liabilities of Bank Directors
(1980)).
168. E.g., William T. Marshall, A Director's Guide to Commercial Lending, Direc-
tors Digest, July/Aug. 1983, at 8, 8-12 (explaining board obligations with respect to
hiring personnel, promulgating policies, and regulating practice for newly granted
commercial lending powers).
169. E.g., Dr. Roger Fritz, The Six Vital Signs of Board Leadership, Directors Di-




After all, financial institutions universally have access to expert legal
services. The common law defining bank director and officer duties
has been harmonious and clear for at least 100 years.' 0 In addition,
the statutory and regulatory framework for banks was even clearer. 17'
Only one conclusion is therefore possible: Directors understood their
duties to include the exercise of ordinary care. 72
II. DOES FEDERAL COMMON LAW GovERN THE DUTIEs OF
DIRECTORS OF FEDERAL BANKS?
This part explores the government's compelling interest in feder-
ally-insured banks, and notes that federal common law does not con-
flict with Congress's specific objectives or standards in the enactment
of § 1821(k). In addition, this part discusses the history of deposit in-
surance in the context of federal common law. This part concludes
that federal common law should apply to federally-insured banks, re-
gardless of whether the banks are state or federally-chartered.
Generally, a two-pronged inquiry determines the viability of federal
common law in a given context: first, whether the issue is properly
subject to federal power; 73 and second, whether federal common law
170. McCoy, supra note 8, at 1033 ("For over a century courts have scrutinized a
wide array of substantive bank decisions for negligence out of concern for undue risk
to depositors and deposit insurance funds.")
171. See infra part II.
172. See generally Carol Galbraith & Joseph Seidel, FDIC vs. Imprudent Banking
Officials: The Enforcement Apparatus, 104 Banking L.J. 92, 123 (1987) ("[T]he sub-
ject matter of the D&O common-law negligence claims and the [bank regulatory
agencies' enforcement actions] have a common origin in common-law concepts of
prudence and due care.").
173. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the federal government has "ple-
nary" power over federally-chartered and federally-insured banks. Fidelity Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 159 (1982) (holding that federal regula-
tion preempted state law with respect to due-on-sale clauses in home mortgages).
The logic of De La Cuesta compels the conclusion that the "plenary" authority of the
FHLBB, which is now replaced by the OTS, would extend to the definition of director
duties. 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (1995). The OTS, and before it, the FHLBB, have always
held directors to very high standards. For example, regulations require directors to
manage a federal savings association in a safe and sound manner. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 552.6-1 (1995) (requiring that the business of federal savings associations "shall be
under the direction" of the board of directors); 12 C.F.R. § 544.1 (1995) (requiring
federal savings association applicants to file a charter before approval); 12 C.F.R.
§ 563.161 (1995) (requiring "safe and sound" management and financial policies).
Similarly, in 1985, the FHLBB released a detailed policy statement reiterating the
high duties owed by directors. Memorandum R-62 provided that "directors have a
primary responsibility to assure that the institution is operated prudently and in a safe
and sound manner." Memorandum R-62, supra note 159, at 2784.3. Simply stated,
every regulatory statement of the FHLBB, OTS, or other banking agency is utterly
inconsistent with a gross negligence standard. It is axiomatic that legislation should
be construed, if possible, harmoniously with preexisting legislation, including regula-
tory legislation. Therefore, § 1821(k) should be harmonized with the above regula-
tory statements to permit ordinary negligence actions.
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is an appropriate means of governing an issue.174 This second prong
necessarily involves a weighing of the federal interest in the creation
of a federal common law rule. 75 The federal interest in federally-
chartered and federally-insured banks is best manifested in the regula-
tory system established for such banks.
Federally-insured and federally-chartered financial institutions are
relatively unique creatures in the corporate law universe. By charter-
ing banks, the federal government is responsible for the creation and
structuring of these entities. Normally, the jurisdiction that charters
and creates a business entity provides the rules of law for the internal
affairs of the business association. 76 The federal government's de-
posit insurance program, which insures both federally-chartered and
state-chartered banks, exposes the government to risks arising from
the operations of such depository institutions. The bank crisis of the
1980s proved that these risks can be enormous. Thus, the federal gov-
ernment has an important, even compelling, stake in federally-insured
banks, even if chartered by states.
As could be expected, the federal insurance and chartering pro-
grams are accompanied by detailed statutory and regulatory require-
ments. 77 The operations of a federally-chartered bank are provided
for in 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-216.171 This statutory scheme serves as a corpo-
rate code for national banks, much like a state corporation act governs
the operations and structure of a state-created corporation. Issues
such as bank formation, director qualifications, voluntary dissolution,
and merger are addressed in this statutory scheme.'79
Similarly, federal thrifts are incorporated pursuant to statutory reg-
ulations administered by the OTS.1s These regulations provide for
the incorporation of federal savings associations. They also address
174. E.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 718 (1979) (holding
"that a national rule is not necessary to protect the federal interests underlying [a]
loan program[ ]"); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) ("In
absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the
governing rule of [federal] law according to their own standards."); see also Henry J.
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L Rev.
383, 410 (1964) (stating generally that Clearfield decided the issue of whether "the
federal courts should adopt a uniform nation-wide rule or should follow state law").
175. See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. CL 2048, 2055 (1995). The Supreme
Court has noted: "Principles formulated by federal judicial law have been thought by
this Court to be necessary to protect uniquely federal interests." Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964) (citing Clearfield, 318 U.S. 363; D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942)).
176. See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 302 (1971).
177. For an example of these regulatory requirements, see the six volumes of Title
12 of the Code of Federal Regulations relating to Banks and Banking.
178. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-216 (1994).
179. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21, 72, 181, 215a (1994).
180. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 543-44 (1995).
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numerous operational and structural issues, even going so far as to
provide for mandatory form by-laws and charters. 8"
Further, bank deposit insurance is accompanied by detailed regula-
tory requirements designed to control the level of risk an insured bank
may absorb. Lending activities, appraisal policies, diversification of
investments, and loans to insiders are all regulated in a detailed fash-
ion." Moreover, the bank regulatory authorities are given broad
powers to assure that directors of banks do not permit their institu-
tions to engage in "unsafe or unsound" banking practices. 83 Section
1818 of 12 U.S.C. allows the agencies to terminate the deposit insur-
ance of a bank's accounts if operating in an unsafe or unsound man-
ner; to order a bank to cease or desist from unsafe or unsound
banking practices; and to prohibit directors and officers from affiliat-
ing with banks if they engage in an unsafe or unsound banking prac-
tice."8 Directors of a national bank are also subject to liability under
12 U.S.C. § 93 for violating federal laws, such as approving illegal
loans. 85
The pervasive regulatory scheme set by Congress and the regula-
tory agencies has a consistent touchstone: Banks are to be operated in
a safe and sound manner. 8 6 The political branches have clearly mani-
fested a compelling interest in assuring safe and sound banking. 87
This concern is not new. Prior to FIRREA, essentially the same regu-
latory structure persisted for nearly six decades, 8 8 although it was
partially administered by agencies such as the FHLBB and the FSLIC,
181. 12 C.F.R. §§ 544.1, 544.5 (1995).
182. E.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 563-64 (providing detailed regulations for the operation of a
savings association).
183. The "authoritative definition" of "unsafe or unsound" is:
Generally speaking, an "unsafe or unsound practice" embraces any action,
or lack of action, which is contrary to generally accepted standards of pru-
dent operation, the possible consequences of which, if continued, would be
abnormal risk or loss or damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the
agencies administering the insurance funds.
Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. FHLBB, 651 F.2d 259,264 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing 112
Cong. Rec. 26,474 (1966)), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982). This definition was
articulated by the Chairman of the FHLBB during congressional debates on the Fi-
nancial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966. See Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 1029
(1966).
184. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1994).
185. See 12 U.S.C. § 93(b)(8) (1994).
186. E.g., 12 C.F.R. § 563.161 (1995) (requiring "safe and sound" management and
financial policies). Note that the operations of federal banks are under the direction
of the board of directors. See supra note 17.
187. Baxter, supra note 110, at 23-31 (arguing that any fiduciary duty owed directly
to the insurance fund is subsumed in the statutory duty to maintain safe and sound
banking practices).
188. See Schooner, supra note 111, at 188 ("Principles of safety and soundness have
been a source of directors' duties since as early as 1933 when Congress authorized
removal proceedings against national bank directors for unsafe or unsound banking
practices." (citing Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 30, 48 Stat. 162, 193-94)).
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which were abolished by FIRREA.i s9 This continued pervasive regu-
latory framework militates for the conclusion that Congress is deter-
mined to impose every possible protection consistent with safe and
sound banking; it also militates in favor of recognition of the federal
government's compelling interest in both federally-chartered and fed-
erally-insured banks.190 Nevertheless, the question remains whether
this wide-ranging regulation of federal banks, which reflects a compel-
ling governmental interest, means that the federal government cannot
avail itself of federal common law regulation, as Gallagher suggests.' 91
A. Supersession of Federal Common Law by FIRREA
Fiduciary duties of care are neither amenable to, nor traditionally
regulated by, statutory regulation. 92 Most states traditionally chose
not to promulgate statutes that address the duties of care for directors,
and instead regulated these duties through state common law. This
ability to regulate through common law existed at the federal level as
well. In the context of regulating business entities such as federal
banks, the federal government has acted more akin to a state govern-
ment. Additionally, in the context of insuring bank deposits, the in-
189. For a general discussion of FIRREA's impact upon the federal banking regu-
latory regime, see Michael P. Malloy, Nothing to Fear But FIRREA Itself. Revising
and Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 Ohio St. LJ.
1117, 1136 (1989) (discussing the regulatory realignment imposed by FIRREA includ-
ing the abolition of FSLIC and FHLBB).
190. Most recently, Congress required the bank regulatory agencies to adopt de-
tailed standards for safe and sound banking in areas such as management, asset qual-
ity, and compensation. 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1 (1994).
191. Most courts have held that federal chartering of banks supported the applica-
tion of federal common law to govern the internal affairs of those banks, including the
duties of directors and officers, prior to FIRREA. Barany v. Buller, 670 F.2d 726,731
(7th Cir. 1982) (applying federal common law to quo warranto proceedings brought
by ousted officers of a federal credit union); Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609, 614-15 (2d Cir. 1967) (finding federal common law remedy for
request for shareholder list of federal savings association); Rettig v. Arlington Heights
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819, 826-27 (N.D. Il. 1975) (applying federal
common law to define corporate opportunity doctrine for federal bank Cit Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Crowley, 393 F. Supp. 644, 656 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (finding that
fiduciary duties of directors and officers of federal banks are defined by federal com-
mon law); Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 371 F. Supp. 306, 313
(C.D. Cal. 1973) (holding that federal common law applies to fiduciary duties of fed-
eral savings association's directors).
Similarly, federal common law applied to state-chartered, but federally-insured
banks to the extent that the risks imposed upon the federally-backed insurance fund
were in issue. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472-73 (1942)
(holding that a federally-insured bank cannot use state law as a defense in an attempt
to misrepresent its assets to public examiners); FSLIC v. Sajovich, 642 F. Supp. 74, 77
(C.D. Cal. 1986) (finding that federal common law defines fiduciary duties of state-
chartered directors); First Hawaiian Bank v. Alexander, 558 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (D.
Haw. 1983) (applying federal common law to define fiduciary duties of state bank
directors); see also FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424, 1432 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying fed-
eral common law to directors of state bank).
192. RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1994).
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herent risk of the government acting as a surety requires enormous
monitoring costs and stringent regulation. Director and officer liabili-
ties have long been subject to common law development, and it makes
little sense to deny the federal government the ability to protect its
compelling interest through common law. 193
Nevertheless, in recent decades the clear trend of the Supreme
Court has been to limit and restrict the applicability of a federal com-
mon law. 194 To the extent that the availability of federal common law
is tied to the strength of a federal interest, however, it would appear
that federally-insured and federally-chartered financial institutions
imply a maximum interest of the federal government. 95 In addition
to an interest resulting from the creation of federally-chartered finan-
cial institutions, the government has an ownership interest in these
banks; after all, the government is the ultimate residual holder of neg-
ative equity claims.
The federal government's ownership interest is best understood as a
potential "unlimited negative equity interest."' 96 In those instances
where the deposit insurance fund is exhausted, the U.S. government
must absorb any unpaid depositor claims. In the banking industry, the
largest liabilities of banks are generally deposits. When excessive risk
becomes structurally pandemic in the banking industry, as demon-
strated in the 1980s, or when the industry suffers cost shocks, as it did
in the 1970s, the insurance fund is quickly exhausted. In these circum-
stances, the federal governmdnt is the holder of residual claims of the
financial institution to the extent those claims are below zero. This is
a manifest and compelling federal interest because it directly exposes
the treasury to claims that are potentially worth billions of dollars.
The compelling interest of the federal government concerning the
regulation of federally-chartered and federally-insured banks supports
the application of both federal statutory law and federal common law
to failed bank director and officer liability. First, the political
193. See Rettig, 405 F.Supp. at 825 (stating that it is impossible to define every prac-
tice that constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty); see also D'Oench, 315 U.S. at 470
("Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would be impotent.");
Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504, 510 (1919) (noting that National Bank Act does
not relieve director of obligation to act diligently).
194. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981) (finding that
federal common law is used as a "necessary expedient" when Congress has not spo-
ken to a particular issue); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 65 (holding that there is
no general federal common law), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 637 (1938).
195. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
Harv. L. Rev. 881, 983 (1986) (noting that federal common law is available when
federal interests require a federal solution).
196. Harris Weinstein, Address at Southern Methodist University (Sept. 13, 1990),
in Speech by OTS Chief Counsel Weinstein on Duties of Depository Institution Fiducia-
ries, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 510, 511 (Sept. 24, 1990) [hereinafter Weinstein, SMU
Speech]; see Baxter, supra note 110, at 16 (discussing Weinstein's view that the federal
government is owed a high degree of care because of the equity interest involved).
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branches can be expected to pass legislation with the expectation that
common law will operate on an interstitial basis in areas of compelling
federal interest. This is especially so where the interest is long-stand-
ing and federal common law traditionally has operated. Second, there
is no discernible policy basis for courts refusing to utilize federal com-
mon law to provide interstitial legal principles to even detailed statu-
tory schemes so long as it is consistent with the intent of the political
branches. On the contrary, courts frustrate legislative action when
they attempt to aggrandize judicial power by refusing to allow federal
common law to operate where the legislature intended federal com-
mon law to apply. Third, in many areas of compelling federal interest,
long-standing common law principles are inherently necessary to give
full meaning to the acts of the political branches.
Gallagher fails to appreciate these concerns in its mechanical appli-
cation of the City of Milwaukee v. Illinois'91 test. A careful review of
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding federal common law
fully supports the results reached in Cityfed.198
1. The City of Milwaukee Litigation
The City of Milwaukee litigation does not support the abolition of
federal common law to define the duties of directors and officers of
failed banks for at least three reasons. First, the federal common law
standards for bank director duties do not conflict with specific policy
objectives and statutory standards. Second, the government has spe-
cifically relied upon the operation of federal common law in an area
of compelling interest-specifically, federally created and insured
banks. Third, the political branches have not intended to occupy the
field of director and officer liability.
a. Federal Common Law Does Not Conflict with Specific
Objectives and Standards
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois 99 involved a case where Congress had
specified acceptable water effluent standards;200 the Court therefore
held preexisting federal common law addressing effluent standards to
be superseded. In prior litigation of the suit, however, the Court
found that Congress's activity in this area was insufficient to eliminate
nuisance remedies for excessive effluents under federal common
197. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
198. This Article focuses only upon the applicability of federal common law in the
context of federally-insured banks. For a thorough analysis of the issue of the availa-
bility of federal common law, see generally, Field, supra note 195, at 983 (concluding
that federal common law is available "whenever federal interests require a federal
solution" (emphasis omitted)).
199. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
200. Id. at 307.
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law. 01 Thus, the dispute between the State of Illinois and the City of
Milwaukee provides a paradigm that illustrates the viability of federal
common law despite statutory enactments in areas related to the pre-
existing common law.
City of Milwaukee specifically involved § 301 of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act. Section 301 specified detailed water effluent
limitations.102 The Act also created a new federal agency to issue dis-
charge permits and regulate the field in detail.20 3 The Court con-
cluded that allowing federal common law to vary the specific
requirements of the Act would frustrate Congress's policy objectives
in passing the Act."° In addition, the Court held that Congress occu-
pied the field of permissible water effluent levels by speaking directly
to the issue of specific levels of permissible discharges. °5
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 06 the Court addressed the same
dispute but prior to the Act's enactment. Instead of a detailed specifi-
cation of permissible effluent levels, federal statutory regulation was
less comprehensive. There were several legislative enactments that
touched upon regulation of effluent levels but no specification of ac-
ceptable levels.207 Thus, the court held in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
that federal common law continued to operate to provide remedies
for excessive effluents.208
No circuit court has held that § 1821(k) sets a uniform standard of
gross negligence for director liability. 0 9 In fact, the circuit courts
have uniformly recognized that allowing a negligence standard to op-
erate in tandem with the gross negligence language of § 1821(k) is
precisely what the political branches intended, at least insofar as state
claims for negligence are of some continued viability.210 Therefore,
the possibility of a direct conflict between statute, i.e., § 1821(k), and
federal common law does not exist, as it did in City of Milwaukee.
Instead, under all interpretations, including Gallagher, Congress spe-
cifically understood that § 1821(k) could accommodate the applica-
tion of both negligence and gross negligence standards to different
types of banks, depending on whether the bank was chartered under
state or federal law.
201. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972).
202. City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 320.
203. IL
204. Id
205. Iti at 324.
206. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
207. Idt at 101.
208. Id at 104.




b. Governmental Reliance upon the Operation of Federal Common
Law in an Area of Compelling Interest
When Congress enacted the Financial Institutions and Interest Rate
Control Act of 1978,211 the House Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs noted:
[B]oards of directors of financial institutions have a fiduciary re-
sponsibility for the institution they are managing. Service on a
board of directors is not simply an honorary position. It is a posi-
tion charged with the responsibility for the operations of the institu-
tion, for the safety of depositor's money, for the stockholders'
investments, and for fulfilling its charter's commitment to serve a
community.212
Similarly, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d), as well as regulatory statements, had
also long assumed that board members of federal banks owed their
institutions fiduciary obligations. 213
Yet, no statute or regulation defines the fiduciary duties of officers
or directors of federal banks.21 4 Instead, the fiduciary duties of direc-
tors of federal financial institutions have been left to common law de-
velopment for at least 100 years. At no point in time did Congress or
any president ever express an intent to destroy this important leg of
the regulatory triad that Congress consistently imposed upon the
banking industry. Statutes, administrative agencies and regulations,
and common law work together to protect the federal treasury. It
would appear counter-intuitive for Congress to eliminate the federal
common law aspect of regulation for failed banks in the midst of a
bank crisis of historic proportions. In fact, there is legislative history
which demonstrates Congress's reliance upon the continued operation
of federal common law to complement FIRREA. The Senate Bank-
ing Committee report specified that § 1821(k) preserved the right of
the Federal Liquidators to pursue "simple negligence" claims under
"applicable Federal lawv." 21 5 The plain meaning of the savings clause
seems to contain, therefore, an implicit, and perhaps even an explicit,
directive for courts to continue to apply federal common law.2 16
211. Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3421(a)
(1994)).
212. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9287.
213. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(4)(A)(1994) (permitting the Board to remove
a director or officer who participated in an unsafe or unsound practice in relation to
the association, or who breached his or her fiduciary duty as director or officer),
amended generally by FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
214. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
215. RTC v. Cityfed Fm. Corp., 57 F.3d 1231, 1241 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing 135 Cong.
Rec. S6912 (daily ed. June 19, 1989)).
216. "[Tjhe duties and responsibilities imposed upon fiduciaries and those in posi-
tions of trust by generally accepted... common law principles are implicit" in the
scheme of federal banking regulation. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
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c. Congress Did Not Occupy the Field of Director and Officer
Liability
In FIRREA, Congress added only two statutes-§§ 1821(k) and
1821(l)-that relate directly to the traditional civil liability of directors
and officers. The former statute expressly preserves all other law.
The latter statute merely mandates that awards in all claims against
directors and officers include both principal and interest losses. Nota-
bly, § 1821(l) specifies that damages are available for "improvident"
conduct;217 the use of this term is at odds with the conclusion that
§ 1821(k) sets an exclusive gross negligence standard.
If Congress had intended to occupy the field of director and officer
liability, it would have been logical to address causation standards, the
applicability of the common law doctrine of director adverse domina-
tion to toll the statute of limitations, the effect of regulator negligence
or liquidator negligence, joint and several liability, contribution rules,
settlement bars, defenses such as reliance upon experts or outside pro-
fessionals, a director's liability for voting against a given measure, and
a director's liability if absent for a given measure.218 These issues are
of crucial importance to the field of director and officer liability; yet,
FIRREA has left each of these issues decidedly unoccupied.
Moreover, the operations of federally-insured, and in particular,
federally-chartered, financial institutions have long been heavily regu-
lated. For more than sixty years, a large body of statutes, regulations,
and several agencies have done so. Some of those statutes directly
affected the liability of directors. For example, 12 U.S.C. § 93 im-
posed liability on directors of national banks who knowingly approved
loans in excess of certain limits.2 19 Other statutes permitted regula-
FHLBB, 371 F. Supp. 306, 314 (C.D. Cal. 1973). Some commentators have observed
that Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), requires at least an
implicit directive from Congress for courts to fashion federal common law. See John
T. Cross, Viewing Federal Jurisdiction Through the Looking Glass of Bankruptcy, 23
Seton Hall L. Rev. 530, 549 & n.78 (1993); Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional
Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, Notre Dame
L. Rev. 861, 880-81 & n.112 (1996). But see Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) ("[A]bsent some congressional authorization . . ., federal
common law exists only in ... narrow areas ...
217. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(l) (1994).
218. E.g., FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424, 1434 (7th Cir. 1993) (defining federal
common law on proximate cause); Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Bryan, 902
F.2d 1520, 1523 (10th Cir. 1990) (adopting the doctrine of "adverse domination" as
the federal law of the Tenth Circuit in claims against directors); RTC v. Platt, 853 F.
Supp. 294,297 (S.D. M11. 993) (applying federal common law rules of contribution and
settlement bars to action against directors of failed bank); FDIC v. Butcher, 660 F.
Supp. 1274, 1278 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (addressing claims of regulator negligence); see
also H.R. 316, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing detailed standards relating to
causation, regulator conduct, the business judgment rule, attachment of assets, and
other matters relating to bank manager liability litigation).
219. E.g., Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68 (1919) (holding a director
of a national bank liable for damages resulting from an excessive loan).
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tory agencies to impose civil penalties for certain misconduct.2 0 Yet,
throughout that time, the federal courts found it appropriate for fed-
eral common law to provide an additional basis for liability of direc-
tors and officers and to fill the gaps left by the statutes and
regulations. 2 '1
The political branches cannot be imputed with ignorance of eight
decades of common law in such an important area. Consequently, the
political branches, by acquiescing to this well-developed rule of law,
must have intended not to occupy the field of director liability and
instead have chosen to rely upon the well-developed common law in
this area. Given the Supreme Court's recent holding in United States
v. Texas22 that statutes are presumed not to displace existing federal
common law' and the Court's reaffirmation of that principle in BFP
v. RTC,'24 the political branches must be entitled to rely on the opera-
tion of long-standing federal common law, especially in areas imbued
with a compelling federal interest. Under these circumstances, the
fact that Congress is active in an area supports the application of fed-
eral common law.
It appears difficult to conclude that City of Milwaukee mandates the
destruction of the federal common law definition of duties to bank
directors and officers, given that: (i) there is no conflict between a
specified uniform statutory standard and federal common law; (ii) the
political branches relied upon the continued operation of federal com-
mon law; and (iii) the political branches do not appear to have in-
tended to occupy the field of director liability. Consequently, far from
a directive not to apply federal common law, § 1821(k) appears more
like a directive to apply federal common law. The savings clause of
§ 1821(k), the Senate Banking Committee Report, '  and the pur-
poses provision of FIRREA 6 support this conclusion.
220. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (1994).
221. E.g., Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504,510 (1919) (finding that the National
Bank Act does not relieve directors of duty to act diligently); Hoehn v. Crews, 144
F.2d 665, 672-73 (10th Cir. 1944) (holding that directors may be liable both under
statutes such as 12 U.S.C. § 182 and under federal common law), aff'd sub noa.,
Garber v. Crews, 324 U.S. 200 (1945); Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F .d 409, 417-19 (2d
Cir. 1943) (acknowledging that directors can be held liable both under 12 U.S.C. § 93
for knowing violations of federal statutes and under the federal common law duty to
use reasonable care); Hughes v. Reed, 46 F.2d 435, 438, 440 (10th Cir. 1931) (ac-
knowledging statutory liability, common law liability in tort, and common law liability
for breach of contract for directors of federally-chartered institutions).
222. 507 U.S. 529 (1993).
223. Id at 534 ("[C]ourts may take it as a given that Congress has legislated with an
expectation that... [federal common law] ... will apply except 'when a statutory
purpose to the contrary is evident."' (citations omitted)).
224. 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1764 (1994) (decided only three weeks before O'Melveny).
225. See supra text accompanying note 84.
226. See supra text accompanying note 83.
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2. Deposit Insurance and Federal Common Law
Two Supreme Court cases addressing the viability of federal com-
mon law in the context of federal deposit insurance warrant further
analysis.
a. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC
In D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,2 7 the Supreme Court assessed
the applicability of federal common law to federally-insured banks in
the wake of Erie. D'Oench involved a state-chartered bank that was
federally-insured.2z The court concluded that, because the FDIC was
a federally-created corporation and was an instrumentality charged
with furthering the federal policy of deposit insurance, federal com-
mon law would operate to insulate the FDIC from undisclosed defi-
ciencies in the assets of banks it assumed and took over pursuant to
deposit insurance pay-outs.2 9
D'Oench involved a note that was actually worthless, but appeared
as an asset on an insolvent bank's books and records.2 30 The court
stated that the statutory scheme providing for deposit insurance
reveals "a federal policy to protect [the FDIC], and the public funds
which it administers, against misrepresentations as to the securities or
other assets in the portfolios of the banks which respondent insures or
to which it makes loans."23 '
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in D'Oench expanded upon the
majority's federal common law analysis. Jackson's federal common
law analysis begins with the premise that Erie did not destroy federal
common law, notwithstanding Justice Brandeis's statement in Erie
that "there is no federal general common law. 21 32 Jackson stated:
I do not understand Justice Brandeis's statement.., that "[t]here is
no federal general common law," to deny that the common law may
in proper cases be an aid to, or the basis of, decision of federal ques-
tions. In its context it means to me only that federal courts may not
apply their own notions of the common law at variance with appli-
cable state decisions except "where the constitution [sic], treaties, or
statutes of the United States [so] require or provide." Indeed, in a
case decided on the same day .. . Justice Brandeis said that
"whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned be-
tween the two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon
227. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
228. Id. at 454.
229. Id. at 456-62.
230. Id. at 454.
231. Id. at 457.
232. Idt at 469 (Jackson, J., concurring) (quoting Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78, cert. denied, 305 U.S. 637 (1938)).
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which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be
conclusive."
233
Jackson reasoned that depriving the government of the ability to gov-
ern through federal common law was senseless: "Were we bereft of
the common law, our federal system would be impotent. This follows
from the recognized futility of attempting all-complete statutory
codes, and is apparent from the terms of the Constitution itself."' ' -
Jackson then highlighted some areas where the drafters of the Con-
stitution specifically allowed federal common law to operate?35 Jack-
son concluded that although a federal court sitting in a non-diversity
case may see fit for special reasons to give the law of a state highly
persuasive or even controlling effect, in the final analysis it applies
federal law; and federal law is found in the federal Constitution, stat-
utes, and common law. 36 Jackson also found that the scheme perpe-
trated by the bank and the creditor specifically deceived the FDIC in
its capacity as a "supervising authorit[y].'
b. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC
Fifty years after D'Oench, the Court revisited the interplay of fed-
eral common law and federal deposit insurance. In O'Melveny & My-
ers v. FDIC,238 the FDIC argued that federal common law should
operate to enhance its rights in claims to which it succeeded as liqui-
dator beyond those enjoyed by the failed bank.239 The Court ruled
that the FDIC, as receiver, generally enjoys the same rights that the
failed bank enjoys, no more, no less. As Justice Scalia stated: "Sec-
tion 1821(d)(2)(A)(i), which is part of a Title captioned 'Powers and
duties of [the FDIC] as... receiver,' states that 'the [FDIC] shall...
by operation of law, succeed to-all rights, titles, powers, and privi-
leges of the insured depository institution ....
The FDIC's argument was that its attorney malpractice claim
against counsel for the failed bank it took over, admittedly governed
by California law in general, should benefit from a special federal
common law rule essentially destroying any imputation defense. If
this defense were eliminated, the FDIC would not be hindered by the
fact that an agent of the failed bank had knowledge of the facts coun-
sel allegedly should have disclosed.
233. Id. at 469-70 (footnote omitted) (alteration in original) (citing Hinderlider v.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938)).
234. Id. at 470.
235. Id. at 470-71.
236. IM. at 471-72.
237. Id. at 474-75.
238. 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
239. Id. at 2054.
240. Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1988)).
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The problem with the FDIC's argument was twofold: first, the rec-
ognition of such special federal common law rules requires a signifi-
cant conflict between an identifiable federal policy and state law; and
second, the FDIC's argument is directly contrary to the express state-
ment of the political branches that, as liquidator, it merely succeeds to
the rights of the failed bank.24'
Justice Scalia succinctly restated the FDIC's argument with respect
to a state law conflict with federal law:
The closest respondent comes to identifying a specific, concrete fed-
eral policy or interest that is compromised by California law is its
contention that state rules regarding the imputation of knowledge
might "deplet[e] the deposit insurance fund,"... [b]ut neither FIR-
REA nor the prior law sets forth any anticipated level for the fund,
so what respondent must mean by "depletion" is simply the forego-
ing of any money which, under any conceivable legal rules, might
accrue to the fund. 2
Worse yet, although not highlighted by Justice Scalia, at oral argu-
ment, the FDIC not only failed to raise a conflict with state law, but
affirmatively stated that no conflict was clear.243 Given that there was
no direct conflict posed by state law, the FDIC's argument essentially
urged the Supreme Court to render an opinion approaching advisory
status. In fact, on remand, the Ninth Circuit applied California law to
eliminate the imputation defense. 2 " The litigation in the Supreme
Court had no substantive bearing upon the case.
With respect to the nature and strength of the federal interest-the
supposed protection of the federal fisc and the deposit insurance
fund-the political branches had already weighed those interests and
codified § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) to give the FDIC, as receiver, all rights of
the failed bank. Justice Scalia noted that the general rule is that the
Federal Liquidators succeed to all rights of the failed bank; only lim-
ited statutory enhancements to those rights are provided.245 Justice
241. Id. at 2055-56.
242. I& at 2055 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Respondent at 32).
243. Counsel for the FDIC engaged in the following exchange with the Court:
QUESTION: Well, what is the State law with regard to the imputation de-
fense in these circumstances?
MR. BENDER: It's not entirely clear, Justice O'Connor. We believe that
State law would hold, as would the law of most States, as most Federal
courts that have had to guess what State law was in this area have held, that
State law would hold that this imputation defense is not available to peti-
tioner in these circumstances, because the people who are suing are not the
wrongdoers.
QUESTION: Well then, why do we need a Federal rule?
MR. BENDER: You need a Federal rule in case State law should hold
otherwise.
Oral Argument of Paul Bender on Behalf of the Respondent at 27, O'Melveny &
Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994), available in Westlaw, 1994 WL 665048, at *29.
244. FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 61 F.3d 17, 19-20 (9th Cir. 1995).
245. O'Melveny, 114 S. Ct. at 2054.
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Scalia provided a list of exceptions to this general rule, including inter
alia, § 1821(k), and found that no exception was provided for imputa-
tion defenses:2"
Inclusio unius, exclusio alterius. It is hard to avoid the conclusion
that § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) places the FDIC in the shoes of the insol-
vent [bank], to work out its claims under state law, except where
some provision in the extensive framework of FIRREA provides
otherwise. To create additional "federal common-law" exceptions is
not to "supplement" this scheme, but to alter it047
The FDIC's initiative to federalize the law of attorney malpractice was
therefore rejected.
The O'Melveny court did not cite D'Oench, which was discussed at
oral argument and relied upon by the FDIC. Courts have stated that
D'Oench was thereby overruled by O'Melveny.24 Tis conclusion is
not sound, at least insofar as D'Oench operates to define the appro-
priate standards for the application of federal common law to state-
chartered, but federally-insured, banks. Rather, D'Oench is funda-
mentally distinguishable from O'Melveny. First, the rule recognized in
D'Oench vindicated a federal interest that transcended the FDIC's
role as liquidator. Specifically, D'Oench served a non-liquidator inter-
est by assuring that the FDIC, in regulating banks, could rely upon the
accuracy and completeness of a bank's books and records. 49 Second,
Congress had not specifically addressed the consequences of fraud on
the regulators as it addressed the scope of rights to which the FDIC
succeeds.2 0
c. O'Melveny, D'Oench, and § 1821(k)
At least two members of the Supreme Court have interpreted
§ 1821(k) to be preemptive of state laws requiring culpability in excess
of gross negligence for claims against directors and officers of failed
banks. The O'Melveny court specifically discussed § 1821(k):
Respondent argues that § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) should be read as a
nonexclusive grant of rights to the FDIC receiver, which can be sup-
plemented or modified by federal common law; and that FIRREA
as a whole, by demonstrating the high federal interest in this area,
confirms the courts' authority to promulgate such common law.
This argument is demolished by those provisions of FIRREA which
specifically create special federal rules of decision regarding claims
by, and defenses against, the FDIC as receiver .... [including]
§ 1821(k) (permitting claims against directors and officers for gross
246. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (1994).
247. 114 S. Ct. at 2054.
248. See O'Melveny, 61 F.3d at 18-19; see also Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 40
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that FIRREA superseded D'Oendz doctrine).
249. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 464, 472 (1942).
250. Id. at 464.
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negligence, regardless of whether state law would require greater
culpability) .... 251
A similar reference was made in oral argument when the court in-
quired whether § 1821(k) was specifically enacted to enhance the
fights of the Federal Liquidators, and counsel for the FDIC admitted
it was enacted for that purpose. 2
This reading obviously gives the most natural meaning to the sav-
ings clause of § 1821(k). This interpretation also harmonizes
§ 1821(k) and § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i). Section 1821(k) is merely a statu-
tory enhancement of the Federal Liquidators' rights-rights that
otherwise would be governed by § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i). Congress was
protecting the Federal Liquidators from the operation of potentiallyinimical state legislation. The plain meaning of the first clause is pre-
served by reading it to preempt state laws to the extent that they
would operate to insulate failed bank directors for conduct more egre-
gious than gross negligence. In no event does this interpretation
render any part of § 1821(k) surplusage. At the very least, until a
clear right to proceed against bank directors and officers of failed
banks for ordinary negligence under federal common law, regardless
of where the banks were chartered, was recognized by the Supreme
Court, this protection was needed to protect the Federal Liquidators
from state legislation that insulated directors from negligence actions.
This protection was needed, most notably, in the Fourth, Second, and
Eighth Circuits, each of which left doubtful the availability of a fed-
eral common law right against managers of, at least, state banks, even
if federally-insured .1 3
Assuming this to be the correct statutory construction, as this Arti-
cle argues, there is no basis for § 1821(k) to preempt preexisting fed-
eral common law under the rationale of O'Melveny and D'Oench.
First, the recognition of a federal common law duty of ordinary care
for failed bank directors does not conflict with § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i).
Even under the Seventh Circuit approach, the institution may bring a
federal common law claim for negligence against a director before fail-
251. 114 S. Ct. at 2054.
252. The relevant text of the oral argument reads:
QUESTION: Mr. Bender, was it in FIRREA that they specifically provided
for directors' liability in certain cases where the liability might have been
doubtful under State law?
MR. BENDER: Yes.
QUESTION: Isn't that a pretty good reason to assume that Congress did
it's [sic] picking and choosing when it decided the extent to which State com-
mon law might need to be modified to protect the Federal interest?
Oral Argument of Paul Bender on Behalf of Respondent at 41, O'Melveny & Myers
v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994), available in Westlaw, 1994 WL 665048, at *44.
253. RTC v. Everhart, 37 F.3d 151, 153-54 (4th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Gregor, 872 F.
Supp. 1140, 1146 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). Both of these cases hold that federal common law
does not impose duties upon directors of failed banks without even citing D'Oench.
See supra note 27.
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ure.3 All of the circuit courts that have addressed this issue have
reached the same conclusion. Gallagher interprets § 1821(k) to de-
stroy federal common law claims that the Seventh Circuit recognized
a few weeks earlier in Bierman. s5 Gallagher therefore conflicts with
§ 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) by destroying preexisting institution rights once
the institution is transferred to the Federal Liquidators. Conse-
quently, recognition of a federal common law right to pursue directors
and officers of failed banks furthers the manifest intent of the political
branches in promulgating § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i).
Second, like D'Oench and unlike O'Melveny, an important regula-
tory interest is at stake beyond simply protecting the federal fisc. By
depriving the Federal Liquidators of the ability to pursue a federal
common law remedy for breach of the director's duty of due care, a
critical element of the government's regulatory program is under-
mined. For example, the costs of constructing a program that would
detect the particulars of all director and officer misconduct prior to
receivership could well be politically prohibitive. Yet many claims for
misconduct cannot be pursued after the bank fails if a gross negligence
standard applies. It is unlikely that the nation can support, both polit-
ically and economically, over the long-term, a bank regulatory pro-
gram that reviews and monitors every potentially negligent banking
transaction that may ultimately result in failure. Moreover, to the ex-
tent that directors and officers perceive that § 1821(k) may offer shel-
ter, a perverse incentive to seek insolvency is created. A post-failure
gross negligence standard at best encourages reckless conduct by re-
laxing the consequences of failure to bank managers, and at worst en-
courages intentional misconduct by making insolvency attractive to
managers. Clearly, the government's regulatory interest transcends its
role as liquidator, for its ability to prevent the failure of banks is
undermined.
Third, any federal common law right found to exist under § 1821(k)
would not contradict any other statutory provision; instead, recogni-
tion of a federal common law right would be consistent with FIRREA
and would vindicate the reliance of the federal branches upon the op-
eration of federal common law. The proposed statutory construction
urged in this Article is consistent with both § 1821(k) and
§ 1821(d)(2)(A)(i)-unlike the Gallagher opinion, which, in light of
Bierman, directly conflicts with § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i).
The federal government's interest in entities it creates and owns, at
least as residual holder of negative equity claims, is manifest and com-
pelling. As such, unless the political branches specify otherwise, fed-
eral common law should be allowed to operate with a latitude
reflective of the intent of the political branches, the reliance and ex-
254. See FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424, 1434 (7th Cir. 1993).
255. RTC v. GaUagher, 10 F.3d 416, 424 (7th Cir. 1992).
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pectations of the political branches, and the weight of the federal
interest.
The supersession analysis the Court has applied with respect to the
Federal Rules of Evidence reflects these considerations because the
federal government's interest in providing procedural rules in federal
courts is as great as its interest in regulating entities it incorporates
and insures. In fact, it would be difficult to argue that the federal
interest in procedural rules outweighs the federal interest in failed
banks; no trillion dollar debacle hangs in the balance of the applica-
tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court's approach to the
Federal Rules of Evidence is also analogous to the banking law con-
text because preexisting common law provides meaning to the legisla-
tion and supplements the legislation to allow it to operate in a more
complete manner.
In the context of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress enacted a
comprehensive statutory scheme addressing many facets and details of
the law of evidence in a unified statutory codification. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court consistently has recognized that preexisting fed-
eral common law of evidence continues to be viable to the extent that
it is not inconsistent with specific rules of evidence.2 56 Simply stated,
preexisting federal common law "fits" as well with § 1821(k) as preex-
isting federal common law is often found to "fit" with the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence suggests that federal common
law can continue to operate in an area of compelling interest even if
Congress speaks to an issue and occupies a field, if Congress intended
256. For example, in United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984), the Supreme Court
recognized that the common law doctrine of bias for impeachment survived the codi-
fication of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 50. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
that Congress certainly intended to preserve those preexisting common law principles
relating to bias. Id. The Court therefore held that the common law principles that
were consistent with the statutory codification without creating a conflict with con-
gressional intent remained viable. Id. at 51.
The Supreme Court's approach to the preemptive effect of the Federal Rules of
Evidence on preexisting common law was demonstrated again in Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). In Bouraily, the Court interpreted Rule 104 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, which plainly provides a mechanism for preliminary questions
of fact relating to evidentiary issues. The Court therefore found long-standing com-
mon law that required a coconspiracy to be shown by clear and convincing evidence
to be "superseded." Id. at 178-81. In Bourjaily, the Rules spoke specifically to the
proof allowed in preliminary determinations of fact. Preexisting federal common law
therefore gave way. Id.
In 1993, the Supreme Court again addressed the supersession issue in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Court noted that the Federal
Rules of Evidence "occupy the field," but also noted that, in many areas, federal
common law continued to operate in those situations where the common law rule is
"entirely consistent" with the rule and where it was likely that the drafters had in-
tended common law to operate. Id. at 587-88. Based upon this test, the Court held
that the common law Frye test was superseded because it could not be consistent with
Rule 702 which defines standards for expert testimony. Id- at 587-89.
[Vol. 65
BANK DIRECTOR LIABILITY
common law to have continued effect. Given the clear evidence that
the political branches have relied upon courts to regulate the fiduciary
duties of bank managers by common law, D'Oench supports the con-
tinued force of federal common law. The approach of the Court re-
garding the Federal Rules of Evidence is the approach that should
govern in cases of compelling federal interest because it recognizes
that depriving the political branches of the ability to rely upon com-
mon law is as much a judicial power-grab as any free-wheeling con-
cept of federal common law. Section 1821(k), in other words, should
be viewed as an enabling statute for long-standing and preexisting fed-
eral common law.
B. Does Federal Common Law Apply to Federally-Insured State
Banks?
Before 1938, the choice of law issues relating to federally-insured
but state-chartered banks were somewhat less convoluted because the
federal courts applied only federal common law. Also, when dealing
with the duties of care owed by directors and officers of financial insti-
tutions, state law and federal law were essentially indistinguishable.
Since 1938, however, state and federal law regarding director's duties
have diverged substantially. In fact, throughout the 1980s, a number
of states enacted insulating statutes restricting or eliminating liability
for breaches of the duty of care owed by directors.'-
During the 1980s, without any real debate about the underlying pol-
icy basis, the contractarian view of director's duties also gained im-
pressive momentum. 5 s This approach to directors' duties viewed the
entire law of fiduciary duty as merely a default for the inability of
parties to contract appropriately for all foreseeable disputes. A fuller
understanding of the law of fiduciary duty, however, reveals that the
concept of fiduciary duties was also created in order to encourage and
discourage specific types of conduct that were found to be important
to a broader public interest than simply the particular rights and obli-
gations of the parties directly contracting.259 Thus, for example, it can
be argued that even in the context of an ordinary non-federally-in-
sured corporation, directors owe duties of ordinary care that cannot
be contracted away because of the state's interest in assuring that the
corporation it creates and subsidizes through a grant of limited liabil-
ity serves the supposed policy goal of expanding the economy. Re-
257. See supra note 30.
258. See id. (listing the statutory restrictions enacted to insulate directors from lia-
bility); see also FDIC v. Benson, 867 F. Supp. 512, 521-22 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (granting
motion to dismiss bank director negligence claims based upon Texas business judg-
ment rule); FDIC v. Stahl, 854 F. Supp. 1565, 1571 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (entering directed
verdict based upon Florida business judgment rule).
259. Baxter, supra note 110, at 17 ("The fiduciary concept was developed in equity
from the primary concept of the trust and in counterpoint to the common law con-
cepts of contractual obligation. It was never conceived as a 'gap-filer."').
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gardless of the outcome of this debate, it is clear that the state statutes
and common law doctrines aimed at restricting director liability have
only a minimal amenability to the federally-insured bank policy
matrix.
Courts are sharply divided over whether the federal insurance pro-
gram is left to the whim-and-vogue of state law to define its ability to
recover the insurance payments it makes and to enforce the director
duties owed to state banks it regulates. D'Oench provides a model for
the application of federal common law to state-chartered banks. As
previously discussed, D'Oench seems to require two elements to sup-
port such an application of federal common law: first, that the com-
mon law is not inconsistent with Congress's legislation; and second,
that the common law is necessary to support a substantial regulatory
interest beyond the Federal Liquidators's receivership capacity.2 60
The duty of care of directors of federally-insured banks appears to
fulfill the D'Oench requirements. Directors are responsible for man-
aging the business affairs of a corporation. 6' If a regulator cannot
define or enforce the managers' duty of care, it can never hope to
control the risks absorbed by the corporation. Risk control is at the
heart of the federal deposit insurance program. Therefore, D'Oench
appears to support the application of federal common law as a tool in
the federal regulatory arsenal, to state-chartered, federally-insured
banks, insofar as the duties of directors and officers are concerned.
D'Oench was decided in an era when the federal ownership interest
implicated by federal deposit insurance was poorly understood. Up
until the 1980s, there had been no taxpayer bail-out of the industry-
financed deposit insurance fund. In 1996, the federal government
knows better than to assume the fund will always render the federal
ownership interest only theoretical. This realization provides addi-
tional policy support for the application of federal common law.
Whether a state-chartered or federal-chartered bank fails, the conse-
quences to the federal government are the same. There is no basis for
defining the duties of managers differently. The federal government
has a substantial regulatory interest in regulating duties of directors
and officers in all federally-insured banks regardless of whether the
banks are state-chartered or federally-chartered.
A fair reading of § 1821(k) and § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i), as well as other
evidence of legislative history, supports only the conclusion that FIR-
REA was intended to give the Federal Liquidators all the rights of the
institution and to shield the Federal Liquidators from state legislation
insulating directors and officers from liability. Therefore, federal
260. See supra notes 227-37 and accompanying text.




common law can and should apply to define the duties of managers of
federally-insured banks.
III. MUST § 1821(K) BE CONSTRUED TO ELIMINATE FEDERAL
COMMON LAW LIABILrTY FOR MANAGERS OF FAiLED BANKS?
In the previous part, this Article concluded that Congress intended,
indeed relied upon, § 1821(k) to operate to preserve the preexisting
federal common law duties of managers of federally-insured banks.
The analysis underlying this conclusion subsumes most of the analysis
regarding the proper statutory construction of § 1821(k). This part
completes the analysis of the proper statutory construction of
§ 1821(k).
The single most important element of statutory construction is the
intent of the political branches in passing the statute at issue.26- There
are a number of rules of construction that shed light on the intent of
the political branches in passing § 1821(k). This part addresses these
rules as well as the major arguments on each side of the issue.
A. The Surplusage Issue
In RTC v. Gallagher,21 3 the court relied upon the "cardinal principle
of statutory construction" that statutes are to be inte~reted to avoid a
result that renders a part of the statute meaningless. Gallagher con-
cluded: "Reading the 'savings clause' as preserving a federal common
law standard of liability for less culpable conduct than gross negli-
gence would render the substantive portion of § 1821(k)
surplusage."'
The Gallagher argument is based upon the supposition that Con-
gress knew that federal common law applied to define the duties of
directors and officers in both federally-chartered and state-chartered
banks, if federally-insured. Othervise, the "substantive" portion of
§ 1821(k) would operate to defeat state insulating statutes from
shielding directors from liability if state law were held applicable. In-
deed, the Seventh Circuit appeared to hold in Bierman that federal
common law imposed liability upon directors of a state-chartered
bank for ordinary negligence.266 Many courts, however, indeed a
clear majority, have reached different results.267 Congressional intent
should not be imputed with such a ridiculous level of sophistication or
with the ability to address the law in all of the circuits. Even in Ci-
262. See Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45.05 (5th ed.
1992).
263. 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993).
264. Id at 420 (quoting Central Commercial Co. v. Commissioner. 337 F.2d 387,
389 (7th Cir. 1964)).
265. 10 F.3d at 420.
266. See FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424 (7th Cir. 1993).
267. See supra notes 27, 253.
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tyfed, the court so erred."6 The Third Circuit addressed the surplus-
age issue by stating that there is no applicable federal common law to
define the duties of directors and officers of state-chartered banks.
This part of Cityfed is unnecessary if § 1821(k) is viewed from the per-
spective of the chaos surrounding this issue when Congress acted in
1989.
In 1989, when FIRREA was passed, Congress could have had, at
best, only a minimal understanding of the rather sophisticated conflict
of law issues inherent in defining the duty of care of a director of a
failed bank. First, Congress would have had to understand rules un-
derlying the Erie doctrine because there necessarily would be a poten-
tial conflict between the applicability of state and federal laws
regarding the issue of director liabilities. Second, Congress would
have had to fully understand the degree to which either federal insur-
ance or federal chartering supported the applicability of federal com-
mon law to any given question. Third, Congress would have had to
understand the evolving, and somewhat confused, tension between
federal common law and federal statutory law. This matrix of issues
was not only beyond the ken of congressional analysis and resolution,
but has not yet been satisfactorily resolved within the judiciary. If the
Seventh Circuit and Third Circuit, not to mention the district courts,
cannot resolve these issues, Congress could not have fully compre-
hended these issues when enacting FIRREA.269
Specifically, in 1989, when FIRREA was passed, most courts ad-
dressing the issue reached novel and often diametrically opposed con-
clusions regarding which law formed the source of a director's duty of
care.270 Frequently, the issue of whether state or federal law provides
a duty of care for a financial institution's directors and officers was
completely overlooked. Courts therefore addressed the issue, at best,
impliedly and, at worst, not at all.27' The surplusage approach to the
statutory construction of § 1821(k) cannot operate to indicate legisla-
tive intent when it is impossible for the legislature to have intelligently
understood the law creating the apparent surplusage. Similarly, when
courts are sharply divided, it is not appropriate for a court to assume
that only its law was known to Congress in order to find surplusage;
what is surplusage in one circuit may not be nationally. In fact, the
circuits were split on whether federal common law is recognized for
268. See supra note 77.
269. Compare RTC v. Cityfed Fm. Corp., 57 F.3d 1231 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that
enactment of FIRREA did not foreclose RTC's ability to bring a claim under federal
common law), cert. granted sub nom., Atherton v. FDIC, 116 S. Ct. 1415 (1996) with
RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that enactment of FIRREA
preempts federal common law).
270. See supra note 27.
271. See, e.g., Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883, 897 (6th Cir. 1938) (addressing
only briefly whether a federal statute preempts common law liability).
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state-chartered banks when FIRREA was enacted; 272 no part of§ 1821(k) was surplusage when FIRREA was enacted because federal
common law was held inapplicable to state-chartered institutions by
many courts.
B. Congressional Intent in Light of Chaos
The more appropriate analysis is to determine Congress's general
policy objectives in enacting FIRREA, rather than to divine congres-
sional consciousness regarding a specific issue that is immersed in a
legally chaotic environment. Given the confused state of the law on
this issue, Congress's legislative conduct regarding FIRREA and
§ 1821(k) can only be understood as an attempt to restrict the impact
of the movement to narrow director duties in the context of failed
financial institutions.2 73 To expect Congress to have considered all of
the uncertainties of § 1821(k) would require Congress to deliberate
endlessly upon the intricacies of the law as it stood in 1989. Even if it
had done so, the current confusion in the state of the law applicable to
bank director duties demonstrates that a prescient legal mind would
be required to resolve these issues. Congress did not and cannot en-
gage in such dilatory legislative conduct. Congress had a major crisis
with which to deal and wanted to fix a major problem.
After all, at the time FIRREA was passed, the country was just
beginning to appreciate the total losses suffered as a result of the sav-
ings and loan and banking crisis of the 1980s. Clearly, FIRREA
evinces an attempt to minimize losses to the deposit insurance fund
and to minimize the United States Treasury's exposure to the reckless
conduct which gave rise to the financial institution crisis.
For example, Congress gave the RTC protection against many de-
fenses,.74 expanded statutes of limitation,2 75 and permitted the RTC to
repudiate employment or other contracts with directors that might
provide directors with offsetting claims or defenses.276 Congress also
specifically took steps to increase the damage awards that the RTC
272. See supra note 27.
273. See supra note 30. The potential impact of the nationwide effort to restrict the
liability of corporate managers was at the forefront of regulatory concerns when FIR-
REA was passed. In fact, Julie C. Williams, general counsel of the FHLBB, authored
a memorandum which addressed the viability of the insulating statutes to restrict the
liability of bank managers. She apparently concluded that the statutes were not likely
to affect the liability of managers of federal thrifts, but may operate to insulate man-
agers of state-chartered, but federally-insured thrifts. See Weinstock, supra note 31, at
450 n.58. This regulatory analysis explains why the political branches enacted
§ 1821(k), i.e., to preserve the liability, for at least gross negligence, of all directors of
federally-insured thrifts. Like Congress, the regulators could not, short of a Supreme
Court opinion, have divined the extent to which federal common law defined the
duties of bank managers, given the confusion among the circuits.
274. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(9), 1823(e) (1994).
275. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A) (1994).
276. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (1994).
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could recover from officers and directors by taking away the federal
court's discretion to deny prejudgment interest to the RTC. 77 Con-
gress directed the RTC to "maximize[ ] the ... return from the ...
disposition of ... [thrift] assets" that it acquires, including the claims
of failed institutions.2 78
There was only scant discussion about protecting directors. The
Gallagher court cited Senators Riegle, Heflin, and Sanford as support-
ive of a more lenient standard of liability for failed bank directors and
officers.2 79 These statements, however, are simply the views of three
senators? °80 The relevance and influence of these three senators'
views is minimized in light of the hundreds of other members of Con-
gress.281 To exalt this scant discussion over the big picture of FIR-
REA is to miss the forest for the trees.
C. The Missing Piece of the Puzzle: Presidential Intent
Courts have occasionally used presidential intent, or the intent of a
state governor, to analyze the meaning of legislation.2 82 For example,
unlike the Gallagher court, the Third Circuit specifically relied, in
part, upon the statements of President Bush at the time he proposed
the FIRREA legislation.283 Presidential intent seems particularly ap-
propriate as a tool of statutory analysis in those circumstances where
the President is substantially involved in promoting legislation.28
FIRREA appears to have been hatched sometime before Febru-
ary 6, 1989. On that date, President Bush announced he was propos-
ing an "overhaul" of the federal system of bank regulation.8 5 The
277. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(l) (1994).
278. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(i) (1994).
279. RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 422 (7th Cir. 1993).
280. For this very reason, authorities have concluded that the testimony of individ-
ual legislators, even if committee members or sponsors of legislation, is an inappropri-
ate means of proving legislative intent. See Gwendolyn B. Folsom, Legislative
History: Research for the Interpretation of Laws 16-17 (1972) (citing Hust v. Moore-
McCormack Lines, Inc., 328 U.S. 707, 733 (1946)).
281. See generally Singer, supra note 262, § 48.13 (discussing reasons for discount-
ing value of individual legislator's statements).
282. Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia,
J.) (relying on the Reagan administration's press release announcing an intent to
modify various regulations); Singer, supra note 262, § 48.05. The use of presidential
intent to construe statutes is not without controversy. Commentators have argued
that excessive use of presidential intent could undermine the Constitution's principle
of separation of powers. See generally Brad Waites, Note, Let Me Tell You What You
Mean: An Analysis of Presidential Signing Statements, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 755, 777-86
(1987) (concluding that the publication of presidential signing statements for use in
statutory interpretation would inject presidential policy into the congressional and
judicial branches, thus eroding separation of powers).
283. See RTC v. Cityfed Fm. Corp., 57 F.3d 1231, 1239 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Presi-
dent's Plan to Restructure Regulation of Thrifts, Am. Banker, Feb. 8, 1989, at 4 (outlin-
ing President Bush's proposal to resolve the problems in the S&L industry).
284. Waites, supra note 282, at 764.
285. President's News Conference, I Pub. Papers 60 (1989).
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President also stated that the intent of his proposals was to "restore
our entire deposit insurance system to complete health."'  The Presi-
dent stated that "unconscionable risk taking" was a substantial factor
in precipitating the bank crisis. 8 ' Therefore, FIRREA included regu-
lations to limit risk taking. The President wanted to intensify law en-
forcement efforts to "seek out and punish those that have committed
wrongdoing in the management of" the failed banks.' The President
proposed the creation of a $50 billion financing corporation to pay for
the bank crisis, but was hopeful that some of these funds might be
replaced by "recovery of funds from the wrongdoers."I
On August 9, 1989, President Bush made further remarks immedi-
ately prior to signing FIRREA into law.2 90 He stated that FIRREA
was a direct result of the plan he submitted on February 6, 1989. That
plan included a design to "abolish lax regulations" and to increase
"penalties for wrongdoing by officers and directors of insured institu-
tions."' The President stated: "[S]tarting today, tougher require-
ments for safe and sound operating practices will begin to take
effect.' '292 Most importantly, President Bush signed FIRREA because
he felt it would put the financial system on solid footing and assure
that "these problems will never happen again. '"293 Noticeably absent
from the President's remarks was any mention of an intent to relax
the duties owed by directors of failed banks or relieve them from re-
sponsibility under federal common law for mismanaging failed banks.
D. Playing "Gotcha!" with Congress?
Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit has observed that apply-
ing novel and obscure rules of construction or law to subvert congres-
sional intent amounts to a game of "Gotcha" with Congress, whereby
unexpected and under-appreciated legal doctrines operate to materi-
ally alter the plain meaning and intent of statutory legislation.294
Judge Posner argued in Chapman that this was the net effect of Gal-
lagher, which eliminated federal common law liability for directors of
failed federal banks, and Chapman, which eliminated state law. Pos-
ner argued that the doctrine of federal common law supersession, as
applied to § 1821(k), turns congressional intent on its head.2 95 As pre-





290. Remarks on Signing the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
forcement Act of 1989, IT Pub. Papers 1072 (1989).
291. Id. at 1072-73.
292. Id at 1073.
293. Id. at 1072.
294. RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 1126 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J., dissenting).
295. Id. at 1126.
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need not be applied to pervert the intent of Congress and the Presi-
dent in enacting FIRREA.
Posner's argument is premised on the conclusion that Congress did
not wish to insulate directors but, instead, was placing limits on the
effect of state insulating statutes: "There is no evidence that Congress
believed it was creating a new immunity for directors of federal S &
Ls .... ,,296 Judge Posner is clearly correct; those courts that have
held that § 1821(k) supersedes a bank director's federal common law
duty of care indeed essentially have perpetrated a game of "Gotcha "
with Congress, by ignoring the intent of the political branches. By
failing to listen to the content of Congress's message and exalting for-
malism over the substance of § 1821(k), courts have irretrievably gar-
bled the essential statutory intent as reflected on the face of § 1821(k)
and the clear weight of legislative history. 97 As shown, Gallagher and
its progeny similarly have ignored the content of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence articulated in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois298 and its
progeny.
E. Overlooked Rules of Construction
In addition to congressional and presidential intent, there are alter-
nate rules of statutory construction that, at times, are overlooked. Ex-
amination of some of these rules of construction further indicates that
§ 1821(k) does not preempt federal common law.
1. The Common Law Rights of the United States Government
Cannot Implicitly Be Preempted
Generally, the common law is deemed not to have been preempted
by legislation unless congressional intent to preempt the common law
is unmistakable. 99 The Ninth Circuit applied this principle to the
rights of the government in the specific context of § 1821(k): "Judi-
cially construing an implied loss of existing remedies is particularly
inappropriate when applied to the rights of the government. '3°°
Thus, whatever the effect of the rule announced by City of Milwau-
kee in situations not involving federal government agencies or compel-
ling federal interests, there can be no implied preemption of the
federal common law rights of the government, acting through its agen-
cies, the Federal Liquidators. Section 1821(k) does not contain an ex-
296. ld.
297. See supra notes text accompanying 83-84.
298. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
299. See Norfolk Redev. & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464
U.S. 30, 35-36 (1983) (citing Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch 603, 623
(1813)); see also Singer, supra note 262, § 61.01 (stating that "[i]f a change is to be
made in the common law, the legislative purpose to do so must be clearly and plainly
expressed").




press preemption of the federal common law, and, therefore, the
courts holding that the government's rights under preexisting common
law are implicitly preempted are incorrect as a matter of formal statu-
tory construction.
2. Statutes Should Be Construed to Avoid Internal Inconsistencies
A statute should be construed, if at all possible, to avoid producing
inconsistencies among its parts.301 A separate provision of § 1821,
subsection (d)(2)(A)(i), provides that the Federal Liquidators succeed
to all claims of the failed bank, which would include claims against
officers and directors under federal common law.3° Thus, interpret-
ing § 1821(k) to preempt federal common law claims transferred to
the Federal Liquidators by § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) would produce internal
inconsistencies.303
Such an interpretation would conflict also with § 1821(o, which im-
mediately follows § 1821(k). Section 1821() provides that damages
awarded to the Federal Liquidators in proceedings against directors,
officer, and certain others must include appropriate interest. In the
course of providing for interest awards, § 1821() characterized the
proceedings that the Federal Liquidators may bring against directors
and officers as based on claims for "improvident" or "otherwise im-
proper" conduct.3°0 Yet, "improvident" is a term used by the courts
interchangeably with simple negligence; it is not synonymous with
either gross negligence or intentional torts. Congress would not have
provided for simple negligence claims in § 1821(o if, in the immedi-
ately preceding § 1821(k), it had deprived the government of the au-
thority to file such claims in the case of federally-chartered
institutions.
3. Statutes Should Be Construed to Avoid Absurd Results
In construing a statute, "absurd results are to be avoided."' 3 5 Inter-
preting § 1821(k) to eliminate the government's federal common law
rights would produce absurd results.
301. See, e.g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237,
249-54 (1985) (rejecting the literal reading of a statute that would render part of it
meaningless); see also Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1961) (re-jecting a strained reading of a statute which renders one provision redundant).
302. See Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384,390 (6th Cir. 1990), modified on other grotnds,
933 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1991).
303. E.g., McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 538 (allowing FDIC to bring claim under federal
or state common law); FDIC v. Shelton, 789 F. Supp. 1360, 1364-65 (M.D. La. 1992)
(holding that federal law is supplemented by state law as consistent with FDIC rights
under § 1821(k)).
304. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(o (1994).
305. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); see also Garrett v. United
States, 471 U.S. 773, 785-86 (1985) (stating that an "illogical" statutory interpretation
would be "absurd and clearly not what Congress intended"); Commissioner v. Engle,
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Section 1821(k) operates only after a financial institution fails. Ac-
cordingly, as interpreted by Gallagher, § 1821(k) holds officers and
directors of federally-chartered institutions to a simple negligence
standard of liability under federal common law at all times while the
institution remains open, but to a gross negligence standard-with re-
spect to the same pre-failure conduct-once the institution fails. This
double standard would provide a "perverse" incentive to directors and
officers of financial institutions. As the Ninth Circuit stated:
[W]e agree with the district court that adopting the officers' inter-
pretation of § 1821(k) would lead to absurd results, creating "the
perverse incentive for a director in an institution that is having fi-
nancial difficulty to permit the thrift to fall into ruin ... since the
director's own exposure would be greatly reduced upon the institu-
tion of a receivership. 30 6
Before the failure of a thrift and the involvement of federal regula-
tors, liability would attach for simple negligence. After failure, how-
ever, § 1821(k), as interpreted by Gallagher, would preclude
negligence liability. The Tenth Circuit discussed this issue in FDIC v.
Canfield:30 7
As the institution struggles, therefore, section 1821(k) would create
an incentive for the officers and directors to allow the bank to fail.
It simply cannot be that FIRREA would indirectly encourage such
behavior when it was designed in part, according to its stated pur-
poses, "to curtail... activities of savings associations that Pose un-
acceptable risks to the Federal deposit insurance funds."30
Accordingly, § 1821(k) should not be interpreted to preclude federal
common law.
IV. Is THERE AN ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR GALLAGHER?
The articulation of federal common law standards necessarily in-
volves weighing competing policy goals. With respect to the federal
common law standard to apply pursuant to, or in tandem with,
§ 1821(k), it is at least arguable that Congress has already weighed the
policy goals and concluded that simple negligence is the appropriate
standard of liability, as reflected in the Senate banking committee re-
port.30 9 Nevertheless, given the importance of banking to the econ-
omy, it is appropriate to also consider the economic implications of
the standard of failed bank managers. This part considers the eco-
nomic justification of the view that § 1821(k) supersedes federal com-
464 U.S. 206, 218-19 (1984) (finding that an anomalous interpretation of a statute
"does not comport with Congress' [legislative] effort[s]").
306. McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 540 (quoting the district court in FDIC v. McSweeney,
772 F. Supp. 1154, 1159 (S.D. Cal. 1991)).
307. 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 506 U.S. 993 (1992).
308. Id. at 449 (quoting Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 101(3), 103 Stat. 183, 187 (1989)).
309. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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mon law, and concludes that the only tenable economic conclusion is
that § 1821(k) does not preempt federal common law.
No amount of microeconomic modeling or hypothesizing can an-
swer the question of the appropriate standard of care for bank direc-
tors in light of the tragedy of the 1980s.31 Microeconomic theory
hinges upon Pareto Efficiency,31' because only that concept is theoret-
310. The deregulation of the S&L industry has been blamed for much of the loss
from failed banks:
Unfortunately, the otherwise appealing objective of getting government out
of the affairs of business was ill-advised for a bankrupt industry able to use
government-backed deposits as its principal, indeed almost exclusive, source
of capital. By lowering net worth requirements and allowing highly permis-
sive accounting procedures, by encouraging S&Ls to grow rapidly and to
enter new activities quickly, by opening up the industry to developers and
others with conflicts of interest, and curtailing supervision and examination,
the policies created incentives and opportunities for risk taking and abuses
that remained in place for years.
FIRREA Report, supra note 12, at 41; see also Bank Failure, supra note 9, at 87,387
(describing factors contributing to failure of national banks); Strunk & Case, supra
note 9, at 126-27 (identifying a number of factors which caused the failure of the S&L
business).
The deregulation of industry is a darling of microeconomic theorists in that govern-
ment regulation of business is antithetical to perfect competition. Because of the
microeconomic focus of the law and economics movement, "[l]aw and economics has
also contributed significantly to the deregulation movement." Richard A. Posner,
Overcoming Law 96 (1995) [hereinafter Posner, Overcoming Law].
311. Pareto Efficiency is defined as "an allocation of resources in which it is impos-
sible by reallocation to make some consumers better off without simultaneously mak-
ing others worse off." Richard G. Lipsey & Peter 0. Steiner, Economics 952 (6th ed.
1981). A perfectly competitive economy achieves Pareto Efficiency. Edwin Mans-
field, Microeconomics 447 (4th ed. 1982) (stating that "a perfectly competitive econ-
omy satisfies the three sets of conditions for welfare maximization"). A perfectly
competitive economy requires: (i) that the product of any one seller, in a given mar-
ket, is the same as all other sellers, i.e., homogeneity; (ii) that no market participant
has sufficient power to affect price-all market participants are price takers; (iii) that
all resources are perfectly mobile; and (iv) that all market participants have perfect
knowledge of relevant economic data. I& at 248-49. Note that Pareto Efficiency is not
the same as saying that maximum GNP has been achieved. Allan M. Feldman, Wel-
fare Economics, reprinted in The New Palgrave, The World of Economics 715 (J.
Eatwell et al. eds., 1991). Certain further assumptions must be made to achieve
Pareto Efficiency, specifically: (i) that the economy produces no externalities, such as
pollution, ancillary adverse health effects to consumers, etc.; (ii) that there is no tech-
nological change; (iii) that there are no other dynamic considerations, such as risk.
Mansfield, supra, at 449 n.7. A fundamental assumption to all of economics is that
people will rationally maximize their utility, i.e., happiness. Richard A. Posner, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law 3 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law]. Some commentators, in recognition of the rather prodigious assumptions of
microeconomics, have sought shelter in other, more obscure, definitions of efficiency,
such as "Kaldor-Hicks" efficiency. Id at 14. Changing the definition of efficiency
from Pareto Efficiency, however, serves only to weaken the utility of the analysis;
only Pareto Efficiency theoretically supports welfare maximization and general equi-
librium. Also, Kaldor's work has been shown to be internally inconsistent. See Feld-
man, supra, at 720; see also Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth
Maximization, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 509, 519-20, 527 (1980) ("Unlike happiness or well-
being, wealth is not something of intrinsic value.").
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ically consistent with welfare maximization.312 Welfare maximization,
or general equilibrium, is the microeconomic analysis which hypothe-
sizes that all resources are optimally allocated. 13 Microeconomic
modeling and analysis can, therefore, only address the concept of
Pareto Efficiency and not which standard will give rise to a maximum
level of GNP.3 14 Pareto Efficiency also fails to address the issue of
which standard will avoid another taxpayer-financed bail-out, and the
attendant macroeconomic consequences. 1 5 These values, however,
are the crucial economic stakes at issue. More pointedly, it is essential
to avoid repetition of this trillion dollar disaster. This case is, then, a
classic example of the failure of microeconomic theory to address pol-
icy considerations underlying law.316
Gallagher does not have a strong economic policy basis. When the
federal government's interest in deposit insurance, and its
macroeconomic consequences, is properly considered in the calculus
of bank director duties, any possible economic justification for the
Gallagher articulation of the liability of a failed financial institution's
directors evaporates. 31 Much work has been undertaken on an eco-
nomic analysis of director duties in a conventional business associa-
tion. Much of the recent economic analysis has centered on a
contractarian point of view emphasizing that Pareto Efficiency de-
mands that managers and equity holders of businesses be permitted to
freely contract amongst themselves for items such as the duty of due
312. See Mansfield, supra note 311, at 440, 447-49.
313. See id. at 438-39.
314. "Microeconomics deals with the economic behavior of individual units such as
consumers, firms, and resource owners; while macroeconomics deals with the behav-
ior of economic aggregates such as gross national product and the level of employ-
ment." Mansfield, supra note 311, at 1.
315. The vast bulk of the law and economics movement is focused upon
microeconomic analysis of legal issues, specifically: welfare economics-the study of
conditions conducive to Pareto Efficiency; price theory-the study of how prices are
determined; and public choice-the study of the influence of economic interests on
law. David Friedman, Law and Economics, reprinted in The New Palgrave, The World
of Economics 371, 371 (J. Eatwell et al. eds., 1991).
316. The limits of microeconomic theory are well-recognized in both law and eco-
nomics. Economists have long struggled to explain the inability of welfare economics,
i.e., Pareto Efficiency, with its general equilibrium analysis, to explain macroeconomic
phenomena such as large-scale unemployment, credit crises, business-cycle fluctua-
tions, or even wide-spread bank failures. Peter Howitt, Macroeconomics: Relations
with Microeconomics, reprinted in The New Palgrave, The World of Economics 394,
394 (J. Eatwell et al. eds., 1991). Judge Richard Posner has also recognized the limits
of economic efficiency, as well as the validity of its underlying assumptions. Posner,
Overcoming Law, supra note 310, at 419 ("People are not in fact rational maximizers,
prices do not in fact equal marginal cost, markets are never in equilibrium."). Profes-
sor Ronald Dworkin has questioned the utility of any efficiency talisman, at least to
the extent it conflicts with goals of justice. Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 Hof-
stra L. Rev. 563 (1980).
317. RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 419-21 (7th Cir. 1993).
[Vol. 65
BANK DIRECTOR LIABILITY
care, if any, that a manager owes the business entity.318 Whatever the
benefits of requiring legal policy to track conditions for Pareto Effi-
ciency, such an analysis is fundamentally unsound in the context of
deposit insurance.319 Federally guaranteed deposits give the federal
government an "unlimited negative equity interest" in every financial
institution which is federally-insured.3 20 As such, at the very least, no
negotiations between management and equity holders can adequately
reflect the interest of the federal government in maintaining a sound
banking system. There is no practical means for extending to the gov-
ernment a means of negotiating with respect to the duty of care-
short of requiring enormous regulatory and monitoring costs.32
Therefore, such duties must necessarily be addressed legislatively or
through common law. The macroeconomic effects of competing du-
ties of care for bank directors must also be considered. Although one
may argue that a given standard of care would either enhance or di-minish GNP, currently there is no economic theory which allows such
fine tuning adjustments to be analyzed in terms of aggregate output.
Simply stated, there is no clear link between microeconomic Pareto
Efficiency and macroeconomic effects.32 In the absence of any analy-
sis showing a given duty of care to create a macroeconomic benefit,
hypothesizing about the macroeconomic effect of a certain duty of
care is fraught with uncertainty.
On the other hand, there may well be economic consequences to a
duty of care that is greater than or equal to the gross negligence stan-
dard. These consequences are difficult to quantify or analyze in terms
of macroeconomic effect; nevertheless, to the extent a given standard
318. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure
of Corporate Law, 92-93 (1991) ("Because the fiduciary principle is a rule for com-
pleting incomplete bargains .. ., it makes little sense to say that 'fiduciary duties'
trump actual contracts.").
319. Professor Romano has recognized the difficulty in associating a given rule of
law relating to corporate governance to macroeconomic productivity. Roberta Ro-
mano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 140 (1993).
320. Weinstein, SMU Speech, supra note 196, at 511.
321. The Commission charged with determining the causes of the S&L crisis and
making recommendations to prevent a repeat of the crisis recognized these enormous
costs by making the following recommendation:
Each federal agency responsible for regulating institutions receiving federal
financial insurance or guarantees should require that every institution under
its jurisdiction appoint an inspector general ("business practices officer")
who would periodically review and report upon the practices of the institu-
tion. The inspector general should be appointed for a fixed term (e.g., five
years) with approval of the federal regulatory authority. The inspector gen-
eral should be eligible for reappointment for no more than one additional
term. In no case could this officer be removed by an institution except with
the approval of the federal regulatory authority.
FIRREA Report, supra note 12, at 15. Query whether the federal government could
afford an on-site full-time "inspector" for each insured bank; that is why the commis-
sion required the bank itself to hire the inspector.
322. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
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of care leads to a greater level of bank failures and losses to the fed-
eral treasury, macroeconomic consequences ensue. For example, in
assessing the causes of the S&L crisis of the late 1980s, many studies
have concluded that the crisis and the bailout had a significant impact
on both fiscal and monetary policy. The additional federal borrowing
that resulted from the S&L bailout was significant and certainly had a
monetary effect on the economy.323 No microeconomic analysis can
explain this impact of the bank crisis. Stated simply, the additional
borrowing from the S&L crisis would have created a restrictive mone-
tary policy influence to the degree that it resulted in increased interest
rates. Similarly, although the massive bailout increased demand, as a
matter of fiscal policy, this influence was offset by lost demand and a
reduction in the trade balance from the losses in productive capital.32
Unfortunately, the science of economics has yet to create a system
that allows the measurement in precise terms of economic impact of
such developments. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated
the macroeconomic consequences of the disaster: up to $500 billion in
lost GNP between 1981 and 2000.32 These macroeconomic effects
continue until 2017.326
Thus, the appropriate policy response must be to prevent another
bank crisis. As such, any policy objective must be tied to the causes of
the crisis, as best they can be determined. Several detailed studies,
both privately-funded and government-sponsored, have considered
this issue. The causes of the bank crisis are multifarious. Neverthe-
less, one cause is always regarded as significant, i.e., the failure of di-
rectors and officers to manage appropriately their banks. Managers of
banks face a classic "moral hazard" because they do not bear the risks
of their own misconduct.327 Instead, "[t]he deposit insurance system
presented managers with a situation in which the institution got to
keep the rewards if the roll of the dice paid off, but the government's
insurance fund was liable if the gambles failed. ' 328 Thus, directors
and officers pursued reckless strategies:329 "[T]hrifts largely failed be-
323. See CBO Study, supra note 12, at 12-15.
324. See id. at 19.
325. Id. at xi.
326. See supra note 9.
327. See Patricia H. Werhane, Introducing Morality to Thrift Decision Making, 2
Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 125, 127 (1990) (concluding that thrift managers and directors
did not take seriously their responsibility for making viable loans). "Moral hazard" is
a term used to describe actions by agents that further their own interest at the ex-
pense of their principal. Deposit insurance creates moral hazard because the benefits
of risks may accrue to managers (agents) while the costs are absorbed by the institu-
tion (principal) and the insurance fund. See CBO Study, supra note 12, at 11; see also
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 311, at 108 ("The tendency of an in-
sured to relax his efforts to prevent the occurrence of the risk that he has insured
against because he has shifted all or part of the expected cost of the risk to an insur-
ance company is known as 'moral hazard."').




cause of an amalgam of deliberately high-risk strategies, poor business
judgments, foolish strategies, excessive optimism, and sloppy and
careless underwriting, compounded by deteriorating real estate mar-
kets. 330 While most S&L operators did not succumb to the tempta-
tion, the ability to use insured deposits for risky investment was too
tempting for some. The profit potentials produced imprudent risk-
taking, abusive practices, and fraud. There was a continuum of abu-
sive practices running from aggressive pursuit of profit and search for
regulatory loopholes, to out-and-out fraud. Abusive practices in one
form or another, mainly by S&L managers and owners, but also by
unscrupulous attorneys, accountants, appraisers, and investment
bankers, resulted in substantial taxpayer losses. There was unprece-
dented fraud in the industry; despite its repugnance and its unaccept-
able extent, however, it is the Commission's judgment that "fraud
probably accounted for only 10 to 15 percent of total losses. 331
Therefore, it appears clear that a general federal policy of avoiding
bank failures by demanding that managers of federally-insured banks
exercise stringent oversight over management to avoid unnecessarily
risky business conduct is an appropriate economic basis for the gov-
ernment to pursue in the absence of any clear economic indications
otherwise.332 Indeed, the most persuasive argument in favor of a
more lenient standard of care for directors is that the prospect of lia-
bility makes for timid, risk-averse directors; but no real authority
demonstrates that risk-averse directors, chilled and overly-cautious by
the prospect of burdensome duties, in anyway contributed to the bank
crisis. 33
3
The economic justification of stricter monitoring of directors and
officers would seem to argue persuasively for a negligence standard of
330. White, supra note 13, at 117 (emphasis omitted).
331. FIRREA Report, supra note 12, at 8.
332. There is no indication in any of the studies that any director shortage contrib-
uted to the fiasco; nor was director qualifications as opposed to diligence found to be
a cause. Some authorities have speculated that a negligence standard of care would
discourage qualified individuals from being directors. See RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d
416, 424 (7th Cir. 1993). There is no evidence supporting this, however, especially
given that such a standard has been applied for 100 years without any director
shortage arising. See supra notes 116-45.
333. McCoy, supra note 8, at 1033-34. "Most significant, however, is what the
banking industry's experience says about avoiding risk aversion, the classic justifica-
tion for the business judgment rule. As the thrift and bank crisis of the 1980s showed,
far from inducing undue caution in the banking system," imprudent and reckless thrift
and bank decisions led to cascading losses. Id. at 1033. "Whatever can be said about
this latest banking debacle, undue risk aversion was not a problem. Thus, when
viewed against the backdrop of the judiciary's long involvement in substantive bank
regulation, last decade's events raise interesting questions about the risk aversion ra-




liability. First, it appears both intuitively and empirically sound.3 34
Second, it would seem that the bank managers are in the best position
to avoid bank failures, particularly compared to taxpayers, and, there-
fore, are the most efficient cost-avoiders. Thus, there seems to be a
strong economic basis for concluding that bank managers should be
subject to a negligence standard. As such, the economic calculus un-
derlying the duty of care issue for federally-insured banks and S&Ls
weighs decidedly in favor of the Cityfed standard and against the Gal-
lagher standard.
CONCLUSION
The Gallagher court's destruction of the long-standing federal com-
mon law ordinary care standard of liability for bank managers has no
substantial legal or policy basis. The decision cannot be defended on
the basis that federal common law should be restrictively extended
because federal common law has a uniquely appropriate basis for the
governance of federally-chartered and federally-insured institutions.
The decision cannot be defended on the basis of formalistic legal anal-
ysis; traditional legal analysis dictates that the content of congres-
sional statements is more important than the mere fact of the
statement itself. From an economic viewpoint, the only coherent pol-
icy objective must be discouraging excessive risk-taking. Thus, Gal-
lagher is a decision in search of a legitimate basis.
The Cityfed court's approach to the duties of bank directors enjoys
the support of decades of common law development. The common
law, both state and federal, and both before and after Erie, has con-
sistently stated and applied a duty of due care for directors of banks.
There is no evidence that Congress intended to relax this duty; only
that Congress intended to preserve the duties of directors from state
attack. Under Cityfed, the manifestly evident economic policy is to
discourage bank failures.
It is of no moment that Congress failed to address or resolve the
choice of law conundrum implicit in federally-chartered and federally-
insured banks. To the degree the supposed intent of Congress should
affect the plain meaning of the statute, Congress's intent should not be
deemed burdened by choice of law issues that courts themselves can-
not resolve. This means that arguing for a federal common law stan-
dard of ordinary care for all directors of federally-insured banks does
not render any part of § 1821(k) surplusage; at the time it was passed,
as now, there was only confusion and chaos regarding what law ap-
plied under which circumstances. Instead of focusing on this issue,
courts should focus on the political branches' general objective to re-
334. See James R. Chelius, Liability for Industrial Accidents: A Comparison of
Negligence and Strict Liability Systems, 5 J. Legal Stud. 293 (1976) (suggesting that a
more stringent standard of liability results in more accident-avoidance conduct).
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cover losses against responsible managers. Only this explains the
meaning of Congress's legislative exercise in enacting § 1821(k).
Finally, there is no basis for insulating directors and officers from
liability. No such subsidy was intended by any politician. Nor is such
insulation appropriate. Imposing a duty of due care and enforcing
personal liability eliminates problems of moral hazard. While it may
be speculated that a lower duty of care may serve some economic pol-
icy, no such policy is evident. According to every detailed study of the
causes of this trillion dollar nightmare, to grant such a subsidy is tanta-
mount to telling taxpayers: "Keep that checkbook open!"
The Gallagher court's hollowly formalistic approach must give way
to the historically, legally, and economically sound approach of the
Cityfed court. In addition, there is little basis for restricting the availa-
bility of federal common law to federally-chartered banks only; the
Cityfed court's recognition of federal common law should be extended
to federally-insured banks generally.

